The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law by Lawton, Anne
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
2005
The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law
Anne Lawton
Michigan State University College of Law, alawton@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the
Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 817 (2005).
2005] 817 
THE BAD APPLE THEORY IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW 
Anne Lawton· 
"{M]any told the {Office of Inspector General] that . .. the sustained incidents of sexual 
harassment and sexual misconduct are isolated actions by individuals and not evidence of a 
larger, ongoing problem with the State Police. This is the theory of the 'rotten apple' in an 
otherwise clean barrel. "1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nine years ago, I was an Assistant Professor of Business Law in the 
finance department at a public university's business school. At the start of 
my second year, a colleague, who had just earned tenure, began to engage 
in sexually aggressive behavior toward me. Like most victims of sexual 
harassment, I did nothing at first, 2 except speak to a female friend on the 
faculty. I did not report the behavior to the chair of my department nor did I 
register a grievance with the university's affirmative action office. But, as 
the harassment escalated, I realized I had no choice but to report it. 
The university had both formal and informal complaint procedures, 
and, initially, I chose the latter. Doing so was a mistake. While the informal 
procedure stopped the harassing behavior, it involved no fact finding. Thus, 
I had no basis for removing this colleague from my promotion and tenure 
committee, or for objecting to the department's decision, made only three 
months after my informal complaint, to host its annual party at this col-
league's home. 
At the time, I believed that the only way to manage the subtle, nega-
tive effects of having filed an informal complaint was to "go formal" and 
initiate an internal investigation by the university's affirmative action of-
fice. I did so, and ultimately prevailed-in a sense. The university found 
that my colleague had violated the university's sexual harassment policy/ 
but he received only a written reprimand.4 Meanwhile, I had wasted valu-
able time and money-I had hired an attorney-negotiating the ins and outs 
of the university's internal grievance procedure. 
After the formal finding, I transferred to the management department, 
having realized that my harassment complaint had soured my relationship 
with the chair and certain tenured members of the finance department. At 
first, I thought that the transfer had solved my problems. I was wrong. 
2 See Anne Lawton, The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual Harass-
ment, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 85-87 (1999) [hereinafter Emperor's New Clothes] (citing research 
on victim reporting). 
3 Memorandum, Letter of Findings regarding Anne M. Lawton's formal sexual harassment 
complaint against John Smith, at 4 (Apr. 30, 1997) (on file with author). In the citations to the docu-
ments from my sexual harassment case, I use the pseudonyms John Smith for the professor whom I 
charged with sexual harassment, Jack Brown for the chair of the Management Department, and Bob 
White and Mark Jones for the Associate Provost and University President, respectively. 
4 Letter from Bob White, Associate Provost, to Mark Jones, President, regarding Sexual Harass-
ment Complaint of Anne Lawton, Findings and Recommendation, at 1-2 (July 2, 1997) (recommending 
that a letter of reprimand be placed in the professor's personnel file) (on file with author); Letter from 
Bob White, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs and Associate Provost to author and Profes-
sor John Smith, regarding Sexual Harassment Complaint of Anne Lawton, Proposed Findings and 
Recommendation, at 2 (June 17, 1997) (same) (on file with author). 
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Each year at the business school, members of each department evalu-
ate their tenure-track faculty. After the dean of the business school com-
ments on the department's recommendation, it proceeds to the university 
level. During my fourth year at the business school, I received a positive 
recommendation from the management department.5 But, the acting provost 
decided that my package of annual promotion and tenure materials war-
ranted the writing of a cautionary letter.6 In that letter, the provost con-
curred with the management department's "[assessment] of [my] teaching 
and service" but was "less accepting of the nature, sufficiency and quality 
of [my] published work.m The provost recommended that I "seek infor-
mally an early external evaluation" of my scholarly work,8 even though no 
other tenure-track faculty at the business school had to do so. Moreover, 
while the provost wrote letters of concern to seven other tenure-track fac-
ulty members across the university that same year, mine was the only letter 
in which he disagreed with the department's evaluation.9 
By this time, I realized that my decision to file any sort of internal har-
assment complaint had been a mistake. The acting provost had been the 
university official responsible for my sexual harassment case after the ini-
tial findings by the affirmative action office. 10 I came to the realization that 
I would face an uphill battle if I were to apply for tenure. Thus, I decided to 
leave the university. 
My personal experience at the university made me aware of the defi-
ciencies of what I call the individual model of workplace sexual harass-
ment. That model depicts harassment as an individual, often sexualized, 
dispute between the harasser and his victim. 11 As a result, it renders largely 
invisible the organizational employer's role in creating or fostering a hostile 
work environment. The organizational predictors of harassment-a sex-
segregated work force, male-defined jobs, and an organizational tolerance 
for harassing behavior-play little, if any role, in the federal courts' adjudi-
5 Letter from the Department of Management Tenure Committee to author (Feb. 5, 1999) (on file 
with author). 
6 Letter from Bob White, Acting Provost, to author, regarding Fourth-Year Review (Mar. 9, 
1999) (on file with author). 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 
9 I made a public records request for copies of those other seven promotion and tenure letters, 
which I have on file. The Acting Provost withdrew his recommendation that I seek early external review 
after my department submitted additional information to him about my scholarly work. Letter from Bob 
White, Acting Provost, to Jack Brown, Chair, Department of Management, regarding Anne Lawton's 
Fourth-YearReview(Apr. 15, 1999). 
10 See supra note 4. 
11 I use masculine pronouns when referring to the harasser because most harassers are men. Em-
peror's New Clothes, supra note 2, at 76 n.6 (1999). 
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cation of sexual harassment complaints. As a result, the organizational em-
ployer is presumed to be objective and competent to screen and resolve 
complaints of sexual harassment within the workplace. Moreover, because 
the employer is presumed to be a neutral, objective mediator of these work-
place disputes, the federal courts view with skepticism, and even hostility, 
victims' claims that subsequent, negative work evaluations constitute re-
taliation.12 Finally, because the individual model locates the source of the 
harm with the individual harasser, the assumption is that, without notice, 
the organizational employer is unaware of the harassing conduct. Thus, the 
burden falls on the victim to complain. If she fails to do so, it is her fault for 
not alerting her employer so that it could take steps to stop the harassing 
behavior. 
I saw the individual model of harassment in operation in my case. 
Women faculty members were in the minority at the business school. When 
I left in 2000, women comprised less than 15% of the tenured and tenure-
track faculty members at the business school. During my two-year stint in 
the finance department, I was the only untenured faculty member, and there 
were only two women-myself and a senior, tenured faculty member--out 
of approximately fifteen tenured and tenure-track faculty members. 
The significant disparity in numbers of male versus female faculty 
members affected the working environment. A university-sponsored study 
conducted in 1999 at the business school found that there was "no broad-
based support of diversity among faculty/[administration,] and some evi-
dence of clear resistance."13 Moreover, university studies "establish[ed] that 
women suffer[ed] from a '"chilly or hostile' environment."14 Finally, an 
internal memorandum from the university's provost office dated less than a 
year before I filed my informal harassment complaint concluded that "fe-
males [were] less likely to be tenured than males and more females propor-
tionately leave [the] University than males before the point of the tenure 
decision. "15 
The university, however, considered none of this evidence relevant to 
my sexual harassment complaint. Yet, the social science research demon-
strates that organizational factors are reliable predictors of the incidence of 
workplace harassment. The university treated my harassment complaint as 
an individual problem that I was having with a specific faculty member, 
12 See infra notes 193-94,203-06 and accompanying text. 
13 Plaintiff Elizabeth Li's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, Li 
v. Miami University, No. C-1-97-395 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2000) (citation omitted) (copy on file with 
author). 
14 !d. at 49 (citations omitted). 
15 Memorandum from Anne H. Hopkins, Information on Hiring and Retention of Tenure Track 
Faculty by Gender, at I (May 2, 1996) (copy on file with author). 
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rather than as evidence of a larger pattern of discriminatory workplace con-
duct. Moreover, because my complaint was against a specific faculty mem-
ber, the university presumed that any further complaints I raised were not 
evidence of retaliation, but rather the ordinary tribulations of a tenure-track 
faculty member. By framing the problem within the dominant model of 
sexual harassment, the university missed the larger context in which the 
harassment was occurring. Thus, I became yet another statistic: one of the 
many women who decided to leave the university prior to her tenure year.16 
This Article is about the individual model of workplace sexual har-
assment, which I contend is fundamentally flawed. In Part I.A., I describe 
the three liability standards currently applied in cases of workplace sexual 
harassment. I conclude that all three standards share a common theme: they 
are based on the assumption that the organizational employer plays no role 
in creating the hostile work environment. I contend that the liability rules 
reflect the manner in which the Supreme Court defined the problem of sex-
ual harassment on the job--as an individual, rather than an organizational, 
problem. I then trace, in Part LB., the development of the individual model 
from the Supreme Court's first sexual harassment case-Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson 17-through the Court's enunciation of an affirmative de-
fense in cases of harassment by workplace supervisors in Burlington Indus-
tries v. Ellerth18 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. 19 In all three opinions, 
the Court framed the problem of workplace sexual harassment as a tort-like, 
interpersonal dispute in which the employer is an innocent bystander. By 
doing so, the Court shifted the focus away from the organizational predic-
tors of harassment and created incentives for employers to engage in litiga-
tion-limiting, rather than discrimination-reducing, strategies. 
In Part II of the Article, I describe why the individual model does not 
accomplish its stated goal of deterrence. Part II.A. sets forth the predictors 
of workplace sexual harassment, which are largely organizational in nature. 
In Part II.B., I explain how the individual model of harassment shifts the 
focus of analysis away from the organizational causes of harassment toward 
the employer's paper policies and procedures. Thus, the lower federal 
courts either ignore or deem irrelevant evidence of the organizational pre-
dictors of harassment and concentrate on what the individual model renders 
relevant-the employer's anti-harassment policy and grievance procedure. I 
argue that by doing so, the federal courts create distorted incentives for 
employers-incentives to promulgate litigation-proof anti-harassment pro-
grams that do little to attack the root causes of workplace sexual harass-
16 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
17 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
18 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
19 524 u.s. 775 (1998). 
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ment. Finally, in Part II.C., I examine how the individual model displaces 
responsibility for eliminating workplace sexual harassment onto the victims 
of harassment. The problem, however, is that few victims report harass-
ment. Moreover, the lack of judicial oversight allows employers to re-
define workplace discrimination issues as interpersonal problems to be cor-
rected by the application of appropriate management techniques. This re-
framing, in turn, reinforces a conception of harassment as a non-gendered, 
personal conflict that simply happens to occur at work. 
In Part III of the Article, I argue that two conclusions emerge from the 
sexual harassment case law. The first, discussed in Part liLA., is that the 
Court obscured the reasons for its decision to fashion an individual model 
of harassment by invoking the mantra of fidelity to statutory language and 
Congressional intent. The second, which I examine in Part Ill. B. of the Ar-
ticle, is that the primary goal of the individual model is the preservation of 
an intent-based model of anti-discrimination law premised on a triad of 
assumptions about merit, employer rationality, and the wisdom of market-
based solutions to employment discrimination. 
Finally, I conclude with a brief outline of an alternative model of 
workplace sexual harassment which holds employers directly liable for 
their role in creating or fostering a hostile work environment. But, I am not 
sanguine about the prospects for change. The individual model of harass-
ment is not the result of fidelity to Congressional intent or the product of 
considered evaluation of the social science research on the predictors of 
harassment and the behavior of victims. It stems from deeply held, but con-
troversial, beliefs about merit and the ability of the market to correct prob-
lems of workplace discrimination. Unfortunately, until these unexamined 
assumptions are subject to more critical scrutiny, it is unlikely that mean-
ingful change in sexual harassment legal doctrine will occur. 
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I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
"In any situation, the way a problem is defined generally dictates the kind of solution that is 
proposed; that is, the proposed solution fits the defined problem. "20 
A The Proposed Solution: The Current Liability Framework 
823 
There are currently three liability schemes used in cases of workplace 
sexual harassment.21 The articulated standard of liability varies depending 
on whether the harasser is a supervisor or a co-worker and, if a supervisor, 
whether the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action. 
When the harasser is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable 
only if it fails to respond to the harassment once it knows or should have 
known of the offending workplace conduct. 22 In cases of harassment by 
workplace supervisors, if the harassment culminates in a tangible employ-
ment action, such as termination or a failure to promote, 23 then the em-
ployer is vicariously liable for its supervisor's conduct.24 
20 Barbara A. Gutek, Sexual Harassment at Work: When an Organization Fails to Respond, in 5 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
272, 285 (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996) (citing V.F. NIEVA & BARBARA A. GUTEK, WOMEN AND 
WORK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981 )). 
21 B. Glenn George argues that the lower federal courts have improperly applied the affirmative 
defense enunciated in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) to cases involving employer negligence. See B. Glenn George, If 
You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 
13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 134 (2001). She contends that a proper reading of Ellerth and Faragher 
results in four liability schemes: (I) negligence for co-worker harassment, (2) vicarious liability for 
harassment by a supervisor resulting in a tangible employment action, (3) vicarious liability subject to 
an affirmative defense for harassment by a supervisor that does not result in a tangible employment 
action and of which the employer is unaware, and (4) negligence for harassment by a supervisor of 
which the employer is aware and to which the employer fails to respond. See id. Accepting George's 
argument does not change the fact that the Supreme Court's description of the liability framework is 
missing a critical component-the organization's liability for its role in creating the hostile work envi-
ronment. 
22 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-800 (citing lower federal court decisions); accord Loughman v. 
Malnati Org., 395 F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 2005); Minnich v. Cooper Farms, Inc., 39 F. App'x 289, 293-
94 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, !54 (2d Cir. 2000); Burrell 
v. Star Nursery, 170 F.3d 951,955 (9th Cir. 1999). 
23 A tangible employment action is "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision caus-
ing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (citations omitted). 
24 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790-92. In Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004), the 
Court said that employers may be held "strictly liable." 124 S. Ct. at 2352. While "strict liability" de-
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When the harassment does not culminate in a tangible employment ac-
tion-the "affirmative defense" cases-the employer, once again, is vicari-
ously liable25 but may assert a two-pronged defense to liability.26 Prong one 
of the affirmative defense requires the court to examine the reasonableness 
of the employer's efforts "to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior.'m Under prong two, the court must determine whether 
the "employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise.''28 The employer must prove both elements of the defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 29 
These three standards of employer liability share a common theme: 
they all are premised on the assumption that the organizational employer 
does not create or foster the harassing work environment. In co-worker 
harassment cases, the federal courts hold the employer liable only if it fails 
to promptly respond to reported harassment.30 As the Sixth Circuit ex-
plained in Minnich v. Cooper Farms, Inc./ 1 "[t]he act of discrimination in 
such a case is not the harassment, but rather the inappropriate response to 
the charges of harassment. "32 In other words, liability adheres based on the 
employer's improper response to harassment, not its role in cultivating a 
hostile work environment. 
The analysis is remarkably similar in the affirmative defense cases. 
While an employer must exercise reasonable care to prevent workplace 
harassment by supervisors-an obligation not imposed in co-worker 
cases-the Supreme Court has held that an employer may satisfy its pre-
notes "liability without proof of fault," it most often is applied to cases involving abnormally dangerous 
activities or manufacturers of defective products. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 3 (2000). 
25 
"Although the Court has described this liability-with-a-defense as vicarious liability, the pres-
ence of a defense sharply distinguishes it from the ordinary case of vicarious liability, where the em-
ployer cannot defend by showing reasonableness of its actions." DOBBS, supra note 24, at 915-16; 
accord Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 671,719-20 (2000). 
26 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. While the Supreme Court in Ellerth ex-
plained that an employer might "raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages," Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
at 765, recently, in Suders, the Court described the affirmative defense as a "defense to liability," Sud-
ers, 124 S.Ct. at 2349. Even before the Court's recent decision in Suders, however, the lower federal 
courts had interpreted the affirmative defense as precluding liability altogether, rather than merely 
limiting the employer's liability for damages. See Grossman, supra note 25, at 676-77. 
27 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
28 /d. 
29 /d. 
30 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the employer liability standard for a co-worker har-
assment case. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352 n.6. 
3l 39 F. App'x 289 (6th Cir. 2002). 
32 /d. at 294 (citation omitted). 
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vention obligation by "install[ing] a readily accessible and effective policy 
for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment."33 In theory, 
the lower federal courts are supposed to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
employer's sexual harassment grievance procedure, but, in practice, the 
courts require nothing more from employers than "file-cabinet" compli-
ance, i.e., the mere existence of a policy and procedure.34 In effect, there is 
no substantive prevention obligation, and the inquiry in affirmative defense 
cases, like that in co-worker harassment cases, amounts to little more than 
an examination of the employer's response to reported harassment.35 Con-
sequently, the employer's liability stems from its failure to control a rogue 
employee, not from any independent role that it plays in creating the work 
environment in which harassment was likely to and actually did occur.36 
Even when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible em-
ployment action, the Supreme Court has fashioned a liability framework 
that creates a theoretical boundary between the supervisor and his em-
ployer. Labeling the employer's liability for supervisor harassment as vi-
carious is curious. Vicarious liability is liability without fault. 37 Thus, the 
employer is liable because "he must stand good for the wrong of another 
33 Suders, 124 S.Ct. at 2347 (The employer must also show "that the plaintiff unreasonably failed 
to avail herself of that employer-provided preventive or remedial apparatus."). 
34 See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative 
Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 216-222 (2004) [hereinafter Empirical Vacuum] (citing cases 
and concluding that most federal courts "equat[ e] an employer's creation and distribution of an anti-
harassment policy with prevention of harassment"). 
35 In theory, there is another difference between the affirmative defense and co-worker harass-
ment cases: in the former, the employer bears the burden of proof on the affirmative defense, while the 
employee bears the burden of proof on liability in the latter. See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 
F.3d 794, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the employer liability standard for co-worker harass-
ment was "substantively similar to the Ellerth!Faragher defense," with the "chief difference" being 
which party bore the burden of proof); Wilson v. Tulsa Junior Coli., 164 F.3d 534, 541 n.4 (lOth Cir. 
1998) (explaining that while "many of the same facts will be relevant to both negligence and vicarious 
liability claims, in asserting that the employer was negligent, the plaintiff bears the burden of establish-
ing that the employer's conduct was unreasonable, while in a misuse of authority claim, the employer 
bears the burden of establishing as an atlirmative defense that it exercised reasonable care to prevent 
harassment"); Bartniak v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(citing Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180 (2d Cir. 1996)) (explaining that "the major 
difference" in employer liability standards between a co-worker and supervisor harassment case is the 
burden of proof). In practice, however, the standards of liability are essentially the same. By shifting the 
burden of proof on the affirmative defense from the employer to the employee, the lower federal courts 
have blurred any real difference between the two. See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 235-42, 
260-66. 
36 This conclusion holds true even if the Supreme Court intended to maintain a separate cause of 
action based on the employer's failure to respond once it obtained notice that harassment was occurring 
in the workplace. See Gutek, supra note 20. 
37 See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 906. 
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person"38-a supervisor whom the employer had the misfortune of hiring. 
The employer has no independent liability based on its part in the creation 
of a discriminatory work environment. 
Thus, the current liability framework for workplace harassment is 
flawed in at least two respects. First and foremost, there is no theory of 
direct liability for the employer's role in creating or fostering a hostile work 
environment. An employer may be held directly liable for failing to respond 
once an employee reports the harassing conduct. However, holding an em-
ployer liable for its failure to respond to harassment is not the same as mak-
ing the employer responsible for its role in creating the hostile work envi-
ronment in the first instance. 
Second, the Supreme Court's decision to label the employer's liability 
for supervisor harassment as vicarious is simply inconsistent with Title VII 
jurisprudence. If a supervisor at IBM decides not to promote a female man-
ager because of her sex, IBM is directly liable for that decision. But, if the 
same female manager loses a promotion because she refuses to have sex 
with her male superior, then IBM is vicariously liable for the supervisor's 
harassment. 39 
These flaws in the liability framework are a direct result of the way in 
which the Supreme Court has defined the problem of sexual harassment at 
work. In its sexual harassment liability opinions, the Court has shifted the 
focus away from the organizational employer onto the individual harasser 
and his victim. By situating the source of sexual harassment with the indi-
vidual harasser and depicting the organizational employer as an "innocent" 
bystander, the Court has painted a picture of workplace harassment as an 
interpersonal, tort-like dispute, thereby obscuring its connection to larger 
organizational problems of sex discrimination. Finally, by defining harass-
ment as an interpersonal and individual dispute, the Court has created a 
need for employer notice and has justified its conditioning of victim recov-
ery upon exhaustion of the employer's internal grievance procedure. 
38 !d. 
39 The example in the text is drawn from a question posed by one of the Justices to counsel for the 
City of Boca Raton during oral argument in Faragher. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *35-36, 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (No. 97-282), 1998 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 20. 
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B. How the Court Defined the Problem of Workplace Sexual Harassment 
1. How Meritor Shaped the Debate 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson40 was the Supreme Court's first opin-
ion on workplace sexual harassment. Meritor began when Mechelle Vinson 
filed suit against Sidney Taylor, her supervisor, and Capital City Federal 
Savings and Loan Association (the "Bank"),41 alleging "sex discrimination 
in the form of sexual harassment," in violation of Title VII and the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.42 After an eleven-day bench trial, 
Judge Penn of the district court for the District of Columbia rendered a de-
cision in favor of defendants Taylor and the Bank.43 Judge Penn found that 
Vinson had not been "required to grant Taylor or any other member of 
Capital sexual favors as a condition of either her employment or in order to 
obtain promotion.'>44 Therefore, he found that Vinson had not been "the 
victim of sexual harassment and was not the victim of sexual discrimination 
while employed at [the Bank].''45 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial 
court had improperly limited its inquiry to whether Taylor had made out a 
claim for quid pro quo harassment.46 The D.C. Circuit held that on remand 
the trial court should evaluate the evidence in light of a hostile work envi-
ronment theory of sexual harassment.47 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the D.C. Circuit on the question ofwhether Title VII includes a 
claim for a hostile work environment based on sex. The Court held that "a 
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimina-
tion based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.''48 
Meritor was a seminal employment discrimination decision because it 
recognized the right of victims of workplace sexual harassment to sue un-
der Title VII not only for quid pro quo harassment, but also for the far more 
40 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
41 Capital City was the name of Vinson's and Taylor's employer prior to a 1985 bank merger. See 
Brieffor the Petitioner at ii, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 1985 WL 
669769 (The brief explains that Capital City merged with Northern Virginia Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, effective May 2, 1985, taking on the name ofPSFS Savings Bank. PSFS changed its name 
to Meritor Savings Bank four months later, effective August 29, 1985.). 
42 Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), 
rev'd, 753 F.2d. 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), a.ffd, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
43 /d. at *24. 
44 /d. at *20, ~ 4. 
45 /d. at *22-23, ~ 21. 
46 See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
47 See id. at 145. 
48 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66 (1986). 
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common form of workplace harassment-hostile work environment.49 The 
decision, however, was perplexing for at least two reasons. First, the Court 
addressed the issue of welcomeness and the apparently related question of 
the admissibility of evidence ofMechelle Vinson's dress and speech,50 even 
though neither issue was relevant to the case on remand. Second, even 
though it admitted that the "debate over the appropriate standard for em-
ployer liability ha[ d] a rather abstract quality to it given the state of the re-
cord," the majority51 nonetheless established the parameters of a liability 
rule that was at odds both with the EEOC Guidelines and prevailing Title 
VII precedent. For the majority, the two issues were intertwined: framing 
the facts within a discussion of welcomeness and workplace attire individu-
alized the harm, thereby making it easier to craft a liability standard prem-
ised on notice to the organizational employer. 
a. Revealing Assumptions About Workplace Attir~2 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between "voluntary" 
and "welcome" sex-related conduct, holding that voluntary participation in 
sexual conduct is not a defense in a Title VII case. 53 The Court concluded 
that the critical inquiry was not the voluntary nature of the sexual contact, 
but whether the plaintiff welcomed the sexual advances made to her. 54 The 
Court further explained that in evaluating whether a woman finds sexual 
advances welcome, evidence of "sexually provocative speech or dress" is 
not per se inadmissible. 55 
What is striking about this portion of the Meritor opinion is that Sid-
ney Taylor, whom Mechelle Vinson claimed had harassed her, denied hav-
ing had any sexual contact with Vinson.56 Why, in a case in which the vic-
tim alleged that the advances were unwelcome and the defendant harasser 
49 See Tanya Kiteri Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construc-
tion of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 211-12 n.l59 (2001). 
50 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69. 
51 Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion in Meritor because he disagreed with the major-
ity's notice-liability standard. /d. at 74-78 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Stevens joined in Marshall's concurring opinion. /d. at 74. 
52 While Meritor involved sexual harassment by a workplace supervisor, the Court's analysis of 
welcomeness and the relevance of evidence of the victim's attire applies equally well to co-worker 
harassment cases. 
53 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. The Court used the term voluntary "in the sense that the complainant 
[is] not forced to participate against her will" in sexual conduct. /d. 
54 /d. 
55 !d. at 68-69. 
56 See Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 
1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d. 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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claimed that he had never even engaged in the complained-of sexual con-
duct, would the Court debate whether the proper standard in a hostile envi-
ronment case was the welcomeness versus the voluntariness of sexual ad-
vances? Furthermore, if the advances were either not welcome, as Vinson 
claimed, or non-existent, as Taylor contended, then of what relevance was 
evidence of Vinson's workplace attire? In order to understand the context 
in which these issues arose, it is necessary to revisit the lower court opin-
ions in Meritor. 
There are two noteworthy aspects of the trial court's opinion in Meri-
tor. First, while the district court found that Vinson's granting of sexual 
favors had not been a condition of her employment,57 it went on to make an 
unusual, alternative finding. The court concluded that even if Vinson and 
Taylor had "engaged in an intimate or sexual relationship during the time of 
[Vinson's] employment with Capital, that relationship was a voluntary 
one."58 
What is unusual about this finding is that it was "directly at odds with 
both parties' version of the events."59At trial, Taylor denied having had any 
sexual contact with Vinson, voluntary or otherwise. "He testified that he 
never fondled [Vinson], never made suggestive remarks to her and never 
engaged in a sexual relationship with her and never asked her to do so. "60 
Of course, Vinson testified to the contrary, alleging that she had engaged in 
sexual relations with Taylor against her will, that Taylor often had raped 
her, and that he had fondled her and made suggestive remarks.61 It is un-
clear, then, on what evidence the trial court based its alternative fmding of 
fact. 62 
Second, the district court never mentioned Vinson's dress or speech in 
its written opinion and findings of fact.63 Moreover, even though the issue 
of the admissibility of Vinson's dress or speech was not briefed on appeal 
57 See id. at *20, ~ 4. 
58 /d. at *20, ~ 5. 
59 Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15 n.6, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(No. 84-1979), 1985 WL 669774 [hereinafter AFL-CIO Brief]. 
60 Vinson, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *6. 
61 /d. at *3-4. 
62 See AFL-CIO Brief, supra note 59, at 15 n.6 (contending that even if "the District Court's 
eccentric fmding [were] entitled to the usual degree of respect, the question would remain whether that 
finding [was] clearly erroneous ... [as] the defense was that there had been no sexual relationship at all, 
[and, thus,] the evidence tending to show that what took place between Taylor and Vinson was not, as 
Vinson claimed, coerced [was] scant to say the least."). 
63 See generally Vinson, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676. 
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to the D.C. Circuit,64 it surfaced, albeit briefly, in the D.C. Circuit's major-
ity opinion.65 The majority noted that it was uncertain what the district court 
had meant when it found that if Taylor and Vinson had engaged in sexual 
relations, that conduct was voluntary.66 But, the D.C. Circuit explained that 
if the district court had meant that voluntary submission to sexual relations 
negated the possibility of a finding of sexual harassment under Title VII, 
then the district court was incorrect.67 While unnecessary to its decision on 
voluntariness, the majority then speculated in a footnote that while "[t]he 
District Court [had] not elaborate[ d] on its basis for the finding of volun-
tariness . . . it may have considered the voluminous testimony regarding 
Vinson's dress and personal fantasies."68 The court further noted that be-
cause "a woman does not waive her Title VII rights by her sartorial or 
whimsical proclivities ... that testimony had no place in this litigation."69 
These two lines dropped into a footnote in the majority's decision formed 
the basis not only for an impassioned dissent by Judge Bork (joined by 
Judges Scalia and Starr) to the panel's decision to deny rehearing en banc,70 
but also for the Bank's petition for certiorari.71 
It is odd, then, that the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an issue 
that merited no mention in the trial court's opinion and only a two-line ref-
erence in a footnote in the Court of Appeals' decision. Moreover, because 
Taylor had testified at the original trial that no sexual conduct, whether 
proper or improper, had occurred,72 on remand, he could not testify that 
Vinson had welcomed his advances without subjecting himself to charges 
of perjury.73 And, if Taylor could not argue that Vinson had welcomed a 
64 Transcript of Oral Argument at *32, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-
1979), 1986 U.S. TRANS LEX1S 86, at *32 [hereinafter Meritor Oral Argument Transcript] (explana-
tion by Patricia Barry, counsel for Vinson, that the "issue of evidence and dress is now before this Court 
without also having been briefed in the Court of Appeals"). 
65 See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
66 !d. at 145-46. 
67 !d. at 146. 
68 !d. at 146 n.36. Apparently, the court drew this conclusion from portions of the trial transcript 
provided by the Bank on appeal. See id.; see also infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
69 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36. 
70 See generally Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting). 
71 In its petition for certiorari, the Bank asked the Supreme Court to take up three questions. The 
third was whether "evidence that the complaining employee invited and welcomed her supervisor's 
sexual advances and voluntarily engaged in workplace sexual conduct [was] admissible in defense of 
her Title VII claim." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit at (i), PSFS Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). 
72 See Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 
1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
73 Meritor Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 64, at *37. 
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sexual relationship with him, what relevance did evidence of Vinson's 
dress and speech have to the case on remand? 
The answer is that neither issue was relevant to the Meritor litigation 
itself. But, both afforded the majority the opportunity to sketch out the pa-
rameters of a liability rule that was at odds with traditional Title VII juris-
prudence. 
b. Agency Principles and Rules of Liability 
In Merit or, the Supreme Court rejected a rule of "automatic" employer 
liability for workplace sexual harassment by supervisors.74 Instead, the 
Court held that "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 
'agent' of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evince[ d) an intent to 
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title 
VII are to be held responsible."75 Citing generally to Sections 219-237 of 
the Second Restatement of Agency, the Court then explained that the lower 
federal courts should look to agency law principles to guide their analysis 
of employer liability.76 
The Court's resort to agency principles and its citation to Sections 
219-237 of the Second Restatement of Agency is perplexing for several 
reasons. First, nothing in the statutory text of Title VII compelled the con-
clusion that the word "agent" evinced Congress's intent to limit employers' 
liability for their employees' conduct under Title VII. 
Defenders of Meritor ... can argue that the blame for this situation, if any, lies with Con-
gress rather than with the Court. Agency law, they would maintain, is relevant to the em-
ployer liability question simply because Title VII makes it relevant. ... For better or worse, 
therefore, it seems that agency law controls, and that the courts' task is to make the best se-
lections from the array of available agency rationales. This dilemma, however, is a false one, 
for Section 70l(b) of Title VII almost certainly does not compel recourse to the common law 
ofagency.77 
74 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (citation omitted) (holding that employers are not "automatically 
liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors"). 
?5 !d. Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who 
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
76 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
77 Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second 
Look at Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1257 (1991); cf Lauren B. Edel-
man, Christopher Uggen & Howard Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Proce-
dures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406, 445 (1999) [hereinafter Rational Myth] (concluding that 
the fact "[t]hat the EEOC must make a case for how agency principles should be interpreted in the 
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In fact, inclusion of the word "agent" in the definition of employer could 
have signaled Congress's intent to expand liability by holding not only or-
ganizational employers, but also individual employees, responsible for their 
discriminatory conduct.78 
Second, at the time that the Court decided Meritor, the EEOC Guide-
lines provided that "general Title VII principles," not agency law rules, 
governed the employer's liability for workplace harassment by a supervi-
sor. 79 Thus, if an employee proved that her supervisor had violated Title 
VII, her employer was liable for that discriminatory decision, regardless of 
whether the employer had knowledge or notice of the discriminatory con-
duct.80 
Third, Sections 219 through 23 7 appear in that portion of the Restate-
ment governing the employer's liability for its employees' torts. 81 But, as 
Professor MacKinnon explained in her brief on behalf of Mechelle Vinson 
in Meritor, sexual harassment is not a tort. 
[W]hile the facts of sexual harassment may be tortious, and torts are compatibly appended in 
a typical claim, sexual harassment as a term of art is not technically a tort any more than 
context of hostile environment cases-and that Meritor cites the EEOC brief in its opinion on what 
agency principles mean-show that there agency principles do not require courts to defer to internal 
grievance procedures"); Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law. 81 VA. L. 
REV. 273, 288 (1995) (describing "[t]he absence of any textual basis for vicarious discrimination liabil-
ity [as] something of a conundrum"). 
78 See Phillips, supra note 77, at 125 8 & n.l58 (citation omitted) (concluding that § 70 I (b), which 
defines employer, "is an individual liability provision" and noting that "'Title VII provides that an 
employer's agent can be individually liable for his discriminatory acts by specifically including agents 
in the definition of employer"'). A majority of federal courts, however, have held that individual em-
ployees are not liable under Title VII. See Tracy L. Gonos, A Policy Analysis of Individual Liability-
The Case for Amending Title VII to Hold Individuals Personally Liable for Their Illegal Discriminatory 
Actions, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 265,271-76 (1998/1999). 
79 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(c) (1985); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 74 (citing the 1985 EEOC Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Sex) ("Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is responsible 
for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regard-
less of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and 
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence."). As Justice Mar-
shall explained in his concurring opinion in Meritor, the notice rule that the majority adopted could not 
"coherently be drawn from the law of agency." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
80 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(c) (1985); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted) (explaining that the EEOC and "the courts ha[d] held for years that an employer is 
liable if a supervisor or an agent violate[ d] the Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any other mitigat-
ing factor"). 
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 219-237 (1958). The Restatement of Agency is 
currently under revision. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No.5, 2004). 
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other species of discrimination in employment are technically torts. Because group-based 
bigotry is not accidental or individualized, as torts tend to be, tort tests tend not to fit. 82 
833 
What is missing from an analysis premised on tort is a recognition that sex-
ual harassment occurs because of sex. Harassment is not an individual, 
personal dispute, but rather a form of sex discrimination. In fact, "[s]exual 
harassment and sex discrimination appear to go together,"83 even though 
"people do not routinely see the connection between gender-related dis-
crimination in the workplace and sexual harassment."84 Viewing sexual 
harassment as an individual, tort-like injury obscures the relationship be-
tween sexual harassment and sex discrimination, both of which occur be-
cause of group-based bigotry. 
c. The Path Established by Meritor 
While unnecessary to the disposition of Vinson's lawsuit on remand, 
the Court's discussion of welcomeness and the admissibility of evidence of 
a victim's workplace attire set the stage for its liability analysis. In Meritor, 
the Court deviated from both traditional Title VII liability rules and the 
existing EEOC Guidelines when it held that employers are not "automati-
cally liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors."85 An individualized 
model of workplace harassment provided the theoretical justification for 
that deviation. 
If sexual harassment is an individual, tort-like dispute, then it seems 
only fair that employers be held liable only for their failure to respond to 
reported harassment. As counsel for Meritor Savings Bank contended at 
oral argument, "there is something . . . very unfair about hailing [sic] an 
innocent employer into court for a problem that it was unaware of and 
would have corrected voluntarily."86 This presumption of employer inno-
cence, in turn, creates a need for victim reporting. After all, if the employer 
82 Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 
84-1979), 1986 WL 728234. The original brief does not contain page numbers. 
83 Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Conse-
quences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 32 (1993). 
84 Audrey J. Murrell, Josephine E. Olson, & Irene Hanson Frieze, Sexual Harassment and Gender 
Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of Women Managers, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 139, 146 (1995) (citation 
omitted). 
8S Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (citation omitted). 
86 Meritor Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 64, at *19; see also Good v. MMR Group, Inc., 
No. 3:00CV-182-H, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20036, at *15 (W.O. Ky. Dec. 4, 2001) (noting that the 
employer "could not address problems of which it was unaware"). 
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is unaware of the harassment and plays no role in creating the hostile work 
environment, then "[f]ederal law cannot help to correct the problem of 
workplace discrimination ~without the cooperation of the victims. "'87 Thus, 
the individual model shifts the burden of alleviating workplace harassment 
from the employer to the victim ofharassment.88 
However, if harassment results from the interplay of individual and 
organizational factors, then it is far more difficult to justify a rule of either 
vicarious liability or one premised on notice to the employer of the dis-
criminatory harassment. If the organizational employer is, in part, responsi-
ble for creating the hostile work environment, then why should it not be 
liable for it and why would notice be necessary? 
In Merit or, the Court began to craft a theory of workplace harassment 
premised on a model of individual, rather than organizational, harm. The 
Court's analysis of whether sexual advances are welcome, evidenced, in 
part, by a woman's workplace attire and speech,89 served to focus attention 
on the individual harasser and his victim. By including these issues in its 
first opinion on sexual harassment, in particular, in a case when neither was 
relevant to the litigation on remand and there was an incomplete trial court 
transcript,90 the Court began to shape a conception of harassment as a tort-
like, individual dispute that simply happens to occur in the workplace. 
2. Ellerth and Faragher: Meritor's Legacy 
In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth91 and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton,92 the Supreme Court continued what it began in Meritor-creating 
87 Lawrence v. Wai-Mart Stores, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1328 n.23 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (racial 
harassment case). 
88 See Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App'x 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that "[t]he effects 
of excusing failures to report would be far reaching and inconsistent with Title VII's goal of purging the 
workplace of sexual harassment"); see also infra Part II. C. 
89 See Brief of Petitioner at 26, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 
1985 WL 669769 (noting that evidence of a victim's workplace attire and speech "show the personal 
nature of the alleged relationship and the welcomeness of the alleged advances"). 
90 AFL-CIO Brief, supra note 59, at 19 n.7 (explaining that the Court of Appeals had only those 
portions of the trial court transcript provided by the Bank). Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Su-
preme Court had a complete transcript because Vinson lacked the funds to pay for one, and the district 
court denied her request, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), for a free transcript. See Meritor Oral Argu-
ment Transcript, supra note 64, at *28 (explanation by Patricia Barry, counsel for Vinson, that her client 
had been unable to afford a trial transcript). The district court explained its decision to deny Vinson's 
request for a free transcript on the ground that Vinson's case did not "[present] a substantial question 
which requires a transcript be furnished at taxpayers' expense." Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12365, at *5 (D.D.C. June 10, 1980) (citation omitted). 
91 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
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an individualized model of workplace sexual harassment.93 Peppered 
throughout the opinions in Ellerth and Faragher are descriptions of work-
place behavior which situate the source of sexual harassment with the indi-
vidual harasser. At the same time, the Court's opinions make clear that the 
employer is normally nothing more than an "innocent" bystander in the 
process. 
In Ellerth, the Court held that as a "general rule ... sexual harassment 
by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment."94 The 
Court reached this conclusion by analogizing sexual harassment to an inten-
tional tort.95 Drawing on part of the Restatement's scope of employment 
test, the Court found that sexual harassment normally is not "actuated, at 
least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer"96 because "[t]he harassing 
supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated and even anti-
thetical to the objectives of the employer."97 The Court then noted that em-
ployers are not liable for the actions of a supervisor "seeking a personal 
end"98 or for an employee's tort "committed while 'acting purely from per-
sonal ill will. " 099 
This language is interesting: it locates the source of the harassment 
within the pathology of the harasser. The words "personal"100 and "mo-
tives"101 illustrate the Court's individual and psychological focus. The ha-
rasser is driven by ill will and his own personal motives102-motives anti-
thetical to the employer's rational business goals and objectives. 
92 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
93 While both Ellerth and Faragher dealt with an employer's liability for its supervisors' conduct, 
the Court's discussion of the source of workplace harassment applies equally to cases involving co-
worker harassment. Moreover, while the Court has not yet ruled on the employer liability standard to 
apply in a co-worker hostile environment case, under current theory, the stronger case for imposing 
liability without notice is one involving harassment by a supervisor.' Thus, the Supreme Court's re-
quirement of notice in supervisor cases justifies the lower federal courts' insistence on notice in co-
worker cases. Moreover, it would be odd indeed if the Court made it easier for a plaintiff to establish 
employer liability in a co-worker case than a supervisor case. 
94 El/erth, 524 U.S. at 757. 
95 See id. at 756; cf supra notes 8!-84 and accompanying text. 
96 El/erth, 524 U.S. at 756 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF AGENCY§ 228(l}(c) (1958)). 
97 I d. (citations omitted). 
98 ld. at 757 (citing F.P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY§ 368 (4th ed. 1952)). 
99 ld. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF AGENCY§ 235, lllustration 2 (1958)). 
100 
"Personal" means "of or peculiar to a certain person." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY I 008 (3d ed. 1997). 
I01 The word "motive" is defined as "some inner drive [or] impulse ... that causes a person to do 
something." Jd. at 886. 
I02 In Ellerth, the Court acknowledged that "[t]here are instances ... where a supervisor engages in 
unlawful discrimination with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employer." Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 757 (citation omitted). But, the Court made clear that such cases were the exception, not the rule. 
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The Court's opinion in Faragher paints a similar picture. In Faragher, 
the Court rejected the argument that workplace harassment by supervisors 
is conduct that falls within the scope of employment}03 The Court's pri-
mary reason for doing so was its conclusion that "[a]s between an innocent 
employer and an innocent employee," adopting a scope of employment test 
would mean that employers could be liable not only for workplace harass-
ment by supervisors, but also harassment by co-workers. 104 
The decision to depict employers as "innocents" is an interesting one. 
It is odd to use language more appropriate to a criminal law defendant 
when referring to a defendant in a civil law case. But, the word "innocent" 
effectively conjures an image of an organizational employer caught be-
tween its corporate objective of maintaining a discrimination-free work-
place and its unfortunate decision to hire a supervisor whom the employer 
could not predict would engage in harassing conduct within the workplace. 
In its analysis of the scope of employment test, the Court in Faragher 
reinforced this framing of the problem. The Court explained that the reason 
for the dizzying array of decisions about the propriety of holding employers 
vicariously liable for intentional torts stemmed from the "differing judg-
ments about the desirability of holding an employer liable for his subordi-
nates' wayward behavior. "105 Later, the Court backed away from the impli-
cations of this policy-oriented approach, concluding that there was no evi-
dence that in enacting Title VII, Congress intended the courts to ignore the 
distinction between scope of employment and "frolics or detours."106 
Both statements by the Court emphasized the individual and personal 
nature of harassment. The employer is held responsible, not because it fos-
tered or created a hostile work environment, but because it hired a wayward 
employee, who engaged in a "frolic and detour"-conduct typically associ-
ated with the employee's own "personal amusement"---during work 
hours. 107 Once again, the Court's language reinforced a conception of har-
assment as a harm caused by individual bad actors working for an other-
wise "innocent" organizational employer. 
The problem with the Court's analysis, however, is that the causes of 
sexual harassment are both individual and organizational. Defining the 
problem of sexual harassment as one of individual rogue employees shifts 
the focus from the organizational employer to the individual harasser. This, 
in turn, affects the framing of the liability rules: employers are rewarded for 
I03 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-801. 
104 !d. at 800. 
105 !d. at 796 (emphasis added). 
106 !d. at 798. 
107 The correct phrase is "frolic and detour," not "frolic or detour," as suggested by the Court. 
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 9!2. 
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promulgating paper policies and procedures, not for addressing the more 
difficult organizational causes of sexual harassment. 108 Thus, employers 
generally need do nothing but wait for victims to report. The resulting li-
ability scheme makes the victims of harassment shoulder much of the bur-
den for eliminating workplace harassment and undermines what the Court 
considers to be Title VII's primary purpose-the deterrence of workplace 
discrimination.109 
II. DETERRING DETERRENCE 
"Nietzsche's observation, that the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is 
trying to do, retains a discomforting relevance to legal science. "110 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court held that Title 
VII's primary objective was the deterrence of workplace sexual harass-
ment.111 The individual model of harassment, however, creates incentives 
for employers to engage in behaviors that effectively undercut this stated 
goal of deterrence. 
The social science research demonstrates that organizational factors 
strongly predict the incidence of workplace sexual harassment. The current 
liability framework, however, rewards employers for establishing and dis-
seminating anti-harassment policies and procedures, even though there is 
no evidence supporting the deterrent value of these paper policies and pro-
cedures.112 Employers commonly escape liability with this "file-cabinet 
compliance"; thus, they have no incentive to address these underlying or-
ganizational causes of workplace sexual harassment. Because the individual 
model shifts the focus away from these organizational predictors, the lower 
federal courts either ignore or deem irrelevant evidence of sex-segregated 
workplaces, male-dominated jobs, and organizational tolerance for sexual 
108 See generally Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34 (concluding that the affirmative defense pro-
vides employers with no incentive to develop strategies for addressing the predictors of workplace 
sexual harassment). 
109 See Gawley v. Ind. Univ., 276 F.3d 301,312 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (explaining that 
Faragher's requirement that harassment victims exhaust their employer's internal grievance procedure 
is "tied to Title VII's primary objective, which is not meant to provide redress but rather to avoid 
harm"). Professor Grossman contends that prior to Ellerth and Faragher, compensation and deterrence 
were "two separate, yet equally important goals" of Title VII, but that in those decisions, the Court 
"elevated deterrence to the 'primary' goal and left compensation by the wayside." Grossman, supra note 
25, at 720-21 (footnotes omitted). 
110 L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:], 46 YALE 
L.J. 52 (1936). 
Ill Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
ll 2 See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 233 & n.l62. 
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harassment. Even when the organizational predictors of workplace sexual 
harassment are ·present in the facts of a case, an employer escapes liability 
under Title VII so long as it has created and disseminated an anti-
harassment policy and a grievance procedure that provides victims with 
several avenues to lodge complaints. 113 As a result, the individual model 
renders largely invisible the employer's role in creating the hostile work 
environment. 
At the same time, because deterrence is tied to victim reporting, the 
model shifts to the victim the responsibility for eliminating workplace sex-
ual harassment. But, as the social science research consistently has demon-
strated, reporting is an uncommon response to sexual harassment. In addi-
tion, the lower federal courts have failed in their oversight of employers' 
judgments on how to implement anti-harassment policies and procedures. 
Doing so has provided employers with incentives to make reporting more 
difficult, thereby reducing the cases in which they receive notice of work-
place harassment. Perhaps more important, however, the lack of judicial 
oversight has allowed employers to redefine cases of workplace sexual har-
assment as instances of non-gendered work conflict, thereby perpetuating 
the individual model's conception of harassment as a tort-like, interpersonal 
dispute. 
A. The Predictors of Harassment 
Over the past twenty years, social science researchers consistently 
have found that organizational factors play an influential, if not determina-
tive, role in the occurrence of sexual harassment in the workplace. Three 
critical predictors of workplace harassment emerge from the research: (1) 
an individual's propensity to harass; (2) the organization's tolerance for 
harassment; and (3) the job gender context-whether the victim performs a 
"male identified" job in a predominantly male workplace. 
First, certain men have a predisposition to engage in sexually harass-
ing behavior} 14 Professor Pryor and his colleagues/ 15 as well as Professors 
1 13 See infra Part II.B. 
114 See John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men. 17 SEX ROLES 269 (1987); see also 
Empirical Vacuum. supra note 34, at 223-24 (describing study). 
115 See John B. Pryor, Janet L. Giedd, & Karen B. Williams, A Social Psychological Model for 
Predicting Sexual Harassment. 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 69, 78 (1995); John B. Pryor, Christine M. LaVite, & 
Lynette Stoller, A Social Psychological Analysis of Sexual Harassment: The Person/Situation Interac-
tion. 42 J. Voc. BEHAV. 68, 77 (1993); see also Empirical Vacuum. supra note 34, at 223-24 (describ-
ing research). Pryor and his colleagues only measured the impact of behavioral norms on the likelihood 
of men to engage in quid pro quo harassment. With quid pro quo harassment, the employer conditions a 
job benefit on the employee providing the employer with sexual favors. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 
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Dekker and Barling, 116 however, have demonstrated that organizational 
norms, such as the presence of harassing as opposed to professional role 
models, influence the willingness of men to engage in harassing conduct. 
Harassment by supervisory personnel both reflects an organizational toler-
ance for sexual harassment and shapes the behavior that male subordinates 
consider appropriate in the workplace. 117 In other words, the supervisor 
serves as a proxy for organizational climate, "sending a signal" that har-
assment is "acceptable conduct in which [co-workers may] indulge safely 
without fear ofreprisal."118 
Second, numerous research studies confirm that organizations that tol-
erate or condone sexual harassment have higher incidences of workplace 
sexual harassment. 119 "[W]omen employees who believe their organization 
is tolerant of sexual harassment-that is, complaints are not taken seri-
ously, it is risky to complain, and perpetrators are unlikely to be pun-
ished--experience considerably higher levels of harassment."120 As organ-
524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).In Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that the labels "quid pro quo" and "hostile 
environment" harassment were of "limited utility" in determining an employer's liability for sexual 
harassment by a workplace supervisor. /d. at 751. 
116 Inez Dekker & Julian Barling, Personal and Organizational Predictors of Workplace Sexual 
Harassment of Women by Men, 3 J. Occ. HEALTH PSYCH. 7 (1998). Dekker and Barling measured the 
effect of organizational tolerance for harassment on the likelihood of men engaging in both gender or 
environmental harassment, and sexualized harassment, which the researchers defined to include "un-
wanted or inappropriate attention, physical or otherwise, and pressure for social contact outside work." 
!d. at II. 
117 See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 233 n.l63 (citing cases); cf Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at 
Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., concurring) (explaining that racially 
derogatory comments by co-workers made when supervisor (who also had made such comments) was 
not present were relevant to "show that the supervisor's statements to the coworkers signaled that the 
supervisor condoned, or even encouraged, the racial harassment of the employee"). 
118 Mason, 233 F.3d at 1048-49 (Ripple, J. concurring) (race harassment case). 
11 9 See Mindy E. Bergman eta!., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Conse-
quences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 230, 238 (2002); Louise F. Fitzgerald 
et a!., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Test of an Integrated 
Model, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 578 (1997); Theresa M. Glomb eta!., Ambient Se.""Cual Harassment: An 
Integrated Model of Antecedents and Consequences, 71 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
309 (1997); Charles W. Mueller eta!., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Unanticipated Conse-
quences of Social Control in Organizations, 28 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 411, 415 (2001); Jill Hunter 
Williams et a!., The Effects of Organizational Practices on Sexual Harassment and Individual Out-
comes in the Military, II MIL. PSYCH. 303 (1999); see also Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 225-
26 (describing studies); Thorn Shanker, Inquiry Faults Commanders in Assaults on Cadets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2004, at Al8 (reporting results of the Pentagon inspector general's report on sexual harassment 
and assault at the Colorado Springs campus of the Air Force Academy and noting that "the service only 
recently imposed measures to change a climate that tolerated abuse of female cadets"). 
120 See Fitzgerald eta!., supra note 119, at 586. 
840 GEO. MASON L. REV. (VOL. 13:4 
izational tolerance for harassment increases, so does the likelihood that 
employees will experience sexual harassment on the job. 
Third, sex segregation on the job plays a critical role in predicting the 
likelihood of workplace sexual harassment. Most Americans work in sex-
segregated jobs, i.e., occupations in which one sex or the other predomi-
nates.121 Describing an occupation as segregated by sex signals not merely a 
"physical separation" but also "a fundamental process in social inequal-
ity."122 For sex segregation is not a neutral phenomenon. It leads to differ-
ences in pay, benefits, training, and opportunity that benefit men and disad-
vantage women. 123 
Women are more likely to experience sexual harassment if they work 
in male-dominated workplaces performing "male" identified jobs, e.g., po-
lice officer or electrician. 124 The research demonstrates that sexual harass-
ment is both a consequence of and a mechanism for perpetuating occupa-
tional sex segregation. Several studies have found that women who suffer 
harassment on the job "[report] higher levels of absenteeism, stronger turn-
over intentions, and spen[ d] more time thinking about leaving their jobs 
than women who ha[ve] not been harassed."125 Thus, women who work at 
nontraditional jobs, which often are marked by skewed gender ratios, are 
more likely to be sexually harassed and, as a result, are more likely to con-
sider quitting their jobs. As Professor Schultz has cogently argued, 
"[h]arassment serves a gender-guarding, competence-undermining func-
tion: By subverting women's capacity to perform favored lines of work, 
121 See Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace. 19 ANN. REv. Soc. 241, 242 (1993) 
[hereinafter Reskin I]; see also Barbara F. Reskin, Employment Discrimination and Its Remedies, in 
SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 567,586-87 (Ivar Berg & 
Arne L. Kalleberg eds., 2001) [hereinafter Reskin II] (citation and footnote omitted) (explaining, based 
on pooled Current Population Survey data for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000, that "at the end of the 
twentieth century, 53 percent of women would have had to change to an occupation in which they were 
underrepresented for the sex's [sic] distributions across detailed occupations to be identical"). 
122 Reskin I, supra note 121, at 241. 
123 /d. at 242 (citing studies). 
124 See Fitzgerald eta!., supra note 119, at 586; MatthewS. Hesson-Mcinnis & Louise F. Fitzger-
ald, Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 877, 
895 (1997); Mueller et al., supra note 119, at 426. 
125 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 119, at 586; see Glomb et al., supra note 119, at 323 (finding that 
"[w]omen who experience sexually harassing behaviors, or are members of work groups where ambient 
sexual harassment is prevalent, report higher levels of absenteeism, intentions to quit, and are more 
likely to leave work early, take long breaks, and miss meetings"); Mueller et al., supra note 119, at 432 
(explaining that there was a "significant difference between [women] who strongly agreed and [women] 
who strongly disagreed to the item 'Sexual harassment is not a problem for me at work': Those strongly 
perceiving sexual harassment as a problem intend to quit more than those strongly perceiving sexual 
harassment as not a problem"). 
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harassment polices the boundaries of the work and protects its idealized 
masculine image-as well as the identity of those who do it."126 
This connection between occupational sex segregation and sexual har-
assment is missing from most judicial opinions on sexual harassment. In 
fact, the research on the predictors of sexual harassment plays little, if any, 
role in most federal court decisions on sexual harassment, even when those 
predictors are presented by the facts of the case. 
B. Distorted Incentives 
The federal court decisions on sexual harassment are a sanitized analy-
sis of harassment divorced from the context in which the harassment actu-
ally occurs. The courts routinely ignore evidence of the organizational 
causes of harassment and focus on the employer's anti-harassment policy 
and procedure when evaluating the employer's liability for sexual harass-
ment. 
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroacf27 illustrates how the fed-
eral courts fail to appreciate the connection between sexual harassment and 
a male-dominated workplace and sex-segregated work. In Caridad, Veron-
ica Caridad, an African-American woman, alleged that her supervisor, Will 
Clarke, had sexually harassed her, including "unwanted sexual touchings," 
and that her male co-workers had "treated [her] hostilely."128 Caridad 
worked as an electrician, which is a predominantly male occupation. 129 Dur-
ing her tenure with the finn, she was the only woman working her shift; the 
remaining twelve employees were all male. 130 The brief description of the 
126 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683, 1691 (1998). 
127 191 F .3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). 
128 See id. at 290. Neither the district court nor the Second Circuit provided much detail about the 
complained-of conduct. The district court suggested that both Caridad's supervisor and co-workers had 
engaged in the harassment, see Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., Nos. 94 Civ. 7374, 95 Civ. 
8594, 1998 WL 17742, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1998), ajJ'd sub nom. Caridad v. Metro-North Com-
muter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999), but the Second Circuit addressed only the supervisor's alleged 
harassing behavior. See Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290-96. 
129 According to the EEOC's 2000 Census Data, women hold only 2.6% of all electrician positions 
in the United States. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 EEO DATA TOOL, 
http://www.census.gov/eeo2000/index.htrnl (Select "Employment by OPM Occupation Groups" and hit 
"Next" button. At the next screen, select "US Total" and the "Next" button. Then request data table for 
"Electricians (635) SOC 47-2111" and hit "Display table" button). Results are on file with the author. 
Black, non-Hispanic women comprise less than one half of one percent of all electricians. See id. 
(Black, non-Hispanic women comprised .3% of the total pool of electricians in the United States accord-
ing to the 2000 Census data.). The Second Circuit described Caridad as an African-American woman. 
Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290. 
130 Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290. 
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Metro-North workplace offered by the Second Circuit confirmed that it was 
a male bastion. The court explained that "[h]istorically, Metro-North ha[d] 
been predominantly male and White."131 Even Caridad recognized the di-
lemma she faced at Metro-North. When the company offered her a transfer 
after she had complained about Clarke's sexual harassment, she "declined 
the transfer, stating that she did not feel it would solve the problem because 
the other work site was also predominantly male."132 
Even though the Second Circuit, in its factual summary, noted that 
Metro-North was a largely white and male firm and that Caridad was the 
only woman on her work crew, the court failed to see the relevance of his-
toric hiring patterns and a male-dominated workplace to Caridad's sexual 
harassment claim. Instead, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's or-
der granting summary judgment to Caridad's employer on her sexual har-
assment claim, concluding that Caridad had unreasonably failed to use her 
employer's grievance procedure to report the harassment. 133 
Caridad highlights the problem with the assumptions underlying sex-
ual harassment law. The Second Circuit assumed that Caridad's problem 
lay with a specific "bad apple"-her supervisor, Clarke. Thus, had she 
complained earlier or even followed through with an internal complaint, 134 
Metro-North could have taken steps to "remedy [the] [problem]"135 that she 
had with Clarke. 
An equally plausible explanation, however, was that Caridad threat-
ened a male preserve-she held a well-paying, skilled job typically per-
formed by men in a historically male firm. Research demonstrates that "the 
attractiveness of an establishment as an employment setting [is] negatively 
related to the share of jobs women and racial minorities hold ... [and that] 
the more establishments pay, the less likely they are to employ racial mi-
norities and women."136 By creating a hostile work environment, Caridad's 
supervisor and co-workers, whom she claimed "treated [her] hostilely,"137 
could drive her from the job, thereby "defend[ing] their occupational turf 
from incursion by women" and protecting the economic value of their 
jobs.138 What the Second Circuit missed in its analysis was the possibility 
131 !d. at 288. 
132 !d. at 290. 
133 !d. at 295. 
l34 See id. at 290 (stating that Caridad "failed to report this harassment, at least initially" and 
explaining that Caridad did not pursue an internal complaint with Stephen Mitchell, the Director of 
Affirmative Action). 
135 !d. at 295. 
l36 Barbara F. Reskin, Debra B. McBrier, & Julie A. Kmec, The Determinants and Consequences 
of Workplace Sex and Race Composition, 25 ANN. REv. Soc. 335,354 (1999) [hereinafter Reskin III]. 
137 Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290. 
138 Schultz, supra note 126, at 1758. 
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that Caridad may have been unable to avoid the harm: a transfer would not 
change the fact that she performed a traditionally male job in a historically 
male workplace. Moreover, by dismissing Caridad's hostile environment 
claim based on little more than the employer's promulgation of an anti-
harassment policy and grievance procedure, the Second Circuit sent an im-
portant message to employers: they will escape liability for discriminatory 
harassment even if they do nothing to address a key organizational predic-
tor of sexual harassment. 
Plaintiffs fare no better with their efforts to introduce evidence of the 
other major contributor to workplace harassment-an organizational cli-
mate tolerant of sexual harassment. When faced with such evidence, the 
federal courts either ignore its significance or deem it irrelevant to an indi-
vidual claim of sexual harassment. 
In Gawley v. Indiana University, 139 the Seventh Circuit chose the for-
mer course of action. Nancy Gawley, a police officer for the university's 
police force, "produced evidence that the department had a history of sex-
ual harassment of its female employees dating back to the early 1980s."140 
While the Seventh Circuit mentioned this history in its factual summary, it 
ignored it completely in its analysis of Gawley's sexual harassment claim. 
Instead, the court relied on the employer's grievance procedure and Gaw-
ley's delay in reporting her supervisor's harassment to affirm the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment to Gawley's employer on her 
hostile work environment claim. 141 
In both Clardy v. Silverleaf Resorts, Inc. 142 and Suders v. Pennsylvania 
State Police, 143 the district courts for the Northern District of Texas and the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, respectively, held that evidence that the 
employer tolerated or condoned sexual harassment in the workplace was 
not germane to the plaintiffs' individual harassment claims. 
In Clardy, Regina Clardy sued her employer, claiming that she had 
been sexually harassed by both her supervisor Pete Loredo and her co-
workers.144 The district court granted the employer's motion for summary 
139 276 F.3d 30I (7th Cir. 2001). 
140 Jd. at 306. 
141 /d.at31I-12. 
142 No. 3:99-CV-2893-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16481 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2001). 
143 Suders v. Pa. State Police, No. 1:CV-00-1655 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2005) (PACER-Docket #80). 
There are several documents, in the ensuing footnotes on the Suders case, that I obtained from Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER"), a service that makes available for a fee the dockets 
and, in some cases, copies of documents filed with various federal courts. The service is located at 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov. Documents obtained from PACER include a parenthetical reference to 
PACER and a docket number. I have copies on file of all PACER documents. 
144 Clardy, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16481, at *2-8. The court concluded that the co-workers' con-
duct did not rise to the level of an actionable claim for sexual harassment. See id. at *21-24. 
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judgment on Clardy's allegations of both supervisor and co-worker harass-
ment. 145 On her claim of supervisor harassment, the court declined to con-
sider affidavits by former Silverleaf employees that "allege[ d] that they also 
were victims of sexual harassment by Silverleaf supervisors. "146 The district 
court concluded that the co-worker affidavits might be relevant in a class 
action lawsuit, but otherwise had no "bearing on Clardy's individual claim 
of sexual harassment by Mr. Laredo."147 
The district court in Suders reached a similar conclusion. In Suders, 
Nancy Lynn Suders, a police communications operator, sued the Pennsyl-
vania State Police ("PSP") alleging that three of her supervisors had sexu-
ally harassed her. 148 While her case wended its way through the federal ap-
pellate process, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court on the issue of 
whether a constructive discharge amounted to a tangible employment ac-
tion!49 a scandal was brewing at the PSP. 
In June of 2003, the Office of Inspector General ("OIG") for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania undertook an investigation into allegations 
of widespread sexual harassment and sexual misconduct by members of the 
PSP}50 The OIG initiated its inquiry in response to a lawsuit filed by Ash-
ley Haber, a teenage runaway, who alleged both sexual misconduct on the 
part of Michael K. Evans, a PSP officer, 151 and a policy or practice on the 
part of the PSP of condoning such misconduct. 152 In September of 2003, the 
OIG issued a ninety-five page report, which contained a wide-ranging cri-
tique of the PSP's handling of sexual harassment and sexual misconduct 
within its ranks} 53 The OIG concluded that within the PSP, there existed an 
145 /d. at *31-32. 
146 Id. at *30 (citation omitted). 
147 /d. at *30-31. 
148 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 129 
(2004). 
149 The Supreme Court held that an employer may invoke the affirmative defense even when the 
employee proves that her resignation qualified as a constructive discharge. See Pa. State Police v. Sud-
ers, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004). The affirmative defense is unavailable to the employer only when the 
employee "quits in reasonable response to an employer-sanctioned adverse action officially changing 
her employment status or situation." /d. The Court remanded the case because there were genuine issues 
of material fact relating to Suders's claims of sexual harassment and constructive discharge. /d. at 2357. 
150 OIG REPORT, supra note I, at i-ii. 
151 Evans previously had pleaded guilty to various charges, including solicitation of prostitution, 
corruption of minors, and indecent assault, and been sentenced to 5 to 10 years in state prison. /d. at 5. 
152 Complaint, Haber v. Evans, No. 2:03-cv-03376 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2003) (PACER-Docket 
#I). The PSP settled with Haber, as well as three other women, in a $5 million global settlement in 
September of 2004. See Shannon P. Duffy, Pa. Trooper Sex Abuse Suits Settled, THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 3, 2004, at I. Claims by two other women were settled for $1.3 million. See id. 
153 See generally OIG REPORT, supra note I. Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell also appointed 
Kroll Associates, Inc. as an independent monitor of the PSP's compliance with the recommendations 
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"organizational culture and attitudes that [did] not regard sexual harassment 
and sexual misconduct as serious issues."I 54 
When the Supreme Court remanded Suders's case, her counsel sought 
to introduce portions of the OIG Report at trial,' 55 but the district court ruled 
to exclude the report in its entirety. 156 In the.most telling portion of its opin-
ion, the court ruled to exclude the OIG's findings of a culture tolerant of 
sexual harassment, concluding that such findings were simply irrelevant to 
the legal issue at trial. 
These pages discuss a perceived attitudinal problem within the PSP with respect to sexual 
harassment. This discussion is simply not relevant to the instant matter. This evidence does 
not go to the weakness of the PSP's sexual harassment policy, but rather to general problems 
regarding sexual harassment that allegedly existed throughout the PSP. 157 
The decision in Suders, like those in Caridad, Clardy, and Gawley, 
reveals the shortcomings of the individualized model of harassment. De-
picting harassment as a tort-like, interpersonal dispute in which the em-
ployer plays no part shifts the focus away from the organizational causes of 
harassment and toward the victim's interaction with the harasser and her 
response to his behavior. Evidence that the employer's workforce is segre-
gated by sex, that a victim performs a "male-defined" job, or that the or-
ganization has a history of sexual harassment or sex discrimination gener-
made in the OIG Report. See Bill Toland, Firm to Monitor State Police; Will Probe Allegations of 
Sexual Misconduct, PIITSBURGH POST -GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 2003, at B-1. Kroll has issued four quarterly 
reports, the most recent on February 21, 2005. See KROLL ASSOCS., INC., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
MONITOR OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2004 (Feb. 21, 2005), available at http://www.psp.state.pa.us/psp/lib/psp/ 
Qtr4_Kroll_Report_Final.pdf. 
I 54 OIG REPORT, supra note I, at xii. 
I55 See Plaintiffs Motion to Admit in Her Case in Chief, or in the Alternative, in Rebuttal, the 
Kroll Report, and the Office of Inspector General's Report, Suders v. Easton, No. I :CV -00-1655 (M.D. 
Pa. Feb. 18, 2005) (PACER-Docket #69). On remand, Suders and the PSP were unable to settle, and 
the district court scheduled the case for trial on its March 2005 calendar. See Scheduling Order, Suders 
v. Easton, No. I:CV-00-1655, at I (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2004) (PACER-Docket #40); see also Plaintiffs 
[sic] Status Report as per the Court's September 14, 2004 Order, Suders v. Easton, No. l:CV-00-1655, 
at 1-2, attached letter (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2004) (PACER-Docket #38) (indicating, as of September 14, 
2004, rejection by defendants of plaintiffs settlement offer and unwillingness to make a counteroffer). 
I56 See Suders v. Pa. State Police, No. I:CV-00-1655, at 5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2005) (mem.) 
(PACER-Docket #80). 
I 57 !d. at 4-5. Suders's case went to trial in March of 2005, and the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the defendant PSP on her sexual harassment claim. See Verdict Form, Suders v. Pa. State Police, No. 
I:CV-00-1655, at I (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2005) (PACER-Docket #100). The jury found that Suders had 
not proven that she was subjected to "severe and pervasive" harassment. !d. at Question I. The standard 
is "severe or pervasive." Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57,67 (1986). 
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ally does not figure into a court's analysis of employer liability. The reason 
is that such evidence is not relevant if the employer is presumed "innocent" 
of any role in creating or fostering the hostile work environment. 
Thus, the prevailing model of harassment provides employers with 
distorted incentives. Employers escape liability by drafting and disseminat-
ing anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures, even though there is 
no evidence that such conduct has any deterrent effect on workplace sexual 
harassment. 158 
[W]hen a prevention program is being offered, it gives the impression that "something is be-
ing done." However, the reality is that it is unclear whether the program makes any differ-
ence .... Ineffective programs can cause significant harm because they may meet an institu-
tion's burden of doing something about sexual harassment without having any effect on the 
bottom line: reducing the incidence of sexual harassment. 159 
Thus, employers create the illusion that they are addressing sexual harass-
ment, while very little is done to change the organizational factors that pre-
dict workplace harassment. By rewarding such behavior, the federal courts 
ultimately undermine the deterrent effect of Title VII. Rather than attacking 
the root of the problem, the courts are doing little more than nipping around 
the edges. 
C. The Problem with Victim Reporting 
While the current model of sexual harassment renders largely invisible 
the organizational employer's role in creating a hostile work environment, 
it magnifies the significance of the victim's role in preventing sexual har-
assment. Many federal courts assume that the employer is powerless to stop 
workplace harassment unless the victim reports it. As the Fourth Circuit 
explained in Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 160 "[l]ittle can be 
done to correct [harassing] behavior unless the victim first blows the whis-
tle on it."161 Thus, the individual model of harassment ties the success of 
158 Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 233. 
159 Elizabeth O'Hare Grundmann, William O'Donohue, & Scott H. Peterson, The Prevention of 
Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 182 (William 
O'Donohue ed., 1997). 
160 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001). 
161 !d. at 268; see also Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 262 F. Supp. 2d 342, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (explaining that "placing the burden on employees is logical because they are the ones with direct 
knowledge of the harassment and without their participation, 'Title VII's remedial and deterrent pur-
poses would not be served'"); Good v. MMR Group, Inc., No. 3:00CV-182-H, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20036, at *15 (W.O. Ky. Dec. 4, 2001) (noting that the employer "could not address problems of which 
it was unaware"). 
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Title VII's goal of deterring harassment to the victim's exhaustion of her 
employer's internal grievance procedure}62 
But the vast majority of victims do not report the harassment to any 
person in authority. 163 In fact, "[t]he research over the past twenty years ... 
has consistently shown that 'filing a formal complaint or reporting the har-
assment to an authority appears to be a very uncommon occurrence. "'164 
Because the individual model of harassment, in large part, predicates em-
ployer action on employee reporting, a low reporting rate suggests that the 
vast majority of discriminatory workplace harassment is left unchecked. 
Furthermore, the federal courts have largely abdicated their responsi-
bility for overseeing the effectiveness of employers' internal grievance pro-
cedures. Because the courts consider sexual harassment to be an interper-
sonal, tort-like dispute, they defer to employer judgments on how best to 
create and implement anti-harassment policies and procedures, considering 
such determinations to fall within basic managerial prerogatives. 165 By do-
162 An employer may be liable for co-worker harassment even if the victim does not formally 
report the conduct using the employer's internal grievance procedure. See, e.g., Flowers v. Honigman 
Miller Schwarz & Cohn, No. 04-71928, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *22 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 
2005) (noting that "[i]t is not necessary that the plaintiff herself put the employer on notice" when the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment). But, the threshold for constructive notice of 
workplace harassment is high. See, e.g., Rennard v. Woodworker's Supply, Inc., 101 F. App'x 296, 304 
(lOth Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (explaining that an employer has constructive knowledge of co-
worker harassment "[ o ]nly when the acts of harassment are so egregious, numerous, and concentrated as 
to add up to a campaign of harassment"); Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (lith Cir. 
2003) (citation omitted) (holding that "[c]onstructive notice is established when the harassment was so 
severe and pervasive that management reasonably should have known of it"); Sharp v. City of Houston, 
164 F.3d 923, 930 (I lth Cir. 1999) (explaining that an employer has constructive knowledge of co-
worker harassment only when someone ''with remedial power over the harasser . . . knew or should 
have known" of the harassing conduct); see also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About 
Speech: Why the Free-Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 391, 439-40 (2002) (footnote omitted) (explaining that "[a]bsent notification, courts will 
find constructive knowledge only if harassment is public and constant, or if the acts of harassment are 
'so egregious, numerous, and concentrated' that they amount to a 'campaign"'). Because the standard 
for constructive knowledge is difficult to satisfy, the victim in a co-worker harassment case is likely to 
Jose unless she can establish actual employer knowledge through a report using the employer's own 
grievance procedure. See, e.g., Rennard, JOJ F. App'x at 304 (stating that the employer has actual 
notice of harassment when the victim reports to "management-level employees"). 
163 See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 208-10 (citing studies). 
164 /d. at 208 (footnote and citation omitted). 
l65 See, e.g., Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation 
omitted) (in co-worker sexual harassment case, explaining that it would have been easier to conclude 
that employer had responded promptly and effectively to plaintiff's complaint had employer "reminded 
its employees of the harassment policy" and provided the plaintiff with "an alternative to dealing di-
rectly with [the harasser]," but that the court did "not 'sit as a super-personnel department"' and em-
ployer's response sufficed); Lawrence v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1328-29 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002) (citation omitted) (in race harassment case, concluding that employer's failure to follow its 
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ing so, they create incentives for employers to make reporting more, rather 
than less, difficult.' 66 The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in EEOC v. Total Sys-
tem Services, Inc., 167 and the Tenth Circuit's decision in Rennard v. Wood-
worker's Supply, Inc., 168 illustrate how leaving to employers the task of 
investigating and remedying workplace harassment creates disincentives 
for employees to report such harassment. 
In Total Systems, the employer terminated Lindy Wright Warren after 
concluding that she had lied during the employer's internal investigation of 
a sexual harassment complaint filed by Susan Norwood,169 one of Warren's 
coworkers. 170 The EEOC sued Total Systems, alleging that Warren had 
been "fired for participating in the employer's investigation and opposing 
what she believed was an unlawful employment practice."171 The district 
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and the EEOC 
appealed, contending that a trial was required to determine whether Warren 
had indeed lied to her employer. 172 The EEOC argued that the "employer 
own policy and inform plaintiff of the discipline imposed against harasser did not prevent employer 
from successfully invoking the affirmative defense because the court would "not reexamine how Defen-
dant's management chose to implement its internal policies"). 
l66 In affirmative defense cases, the federal courts routinely allow employers to define when they 
obtain notice of harassing conduct, thereby discounting victim reports of harassment made to the 
"wrong" supervisory personnel. Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 246-53 (citing cases). The lower 
federal courts also defer to employers on the form that complaints must take, Jetting stand internal 
grievance procedures that require a written complaint prior to any investigation by the employer of 
harassing conduct. See, e.g., Rennard, 101 F. App'x. at 298, 306 n.IO (lOth Cir. 2004) (affmning trial 
court order granting summary judgment to employer on plaintift's claim of co-worker harassment and 
concluding that employer's policy, which penalized victims of sexual harassment for failing to report 
such harassment in writing within a week of its occurrence, had not deterred plaintiff from reporting 
earlier); Ritchie v. Stamler, No. 98-5750, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 568, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) 
(affirming trial court order granting summary judgment to employer on plaintiff's claim of supervisory 
harassment and concluding that employer's policy requiring that harassment complaints be made in 
writing to the firm's president did not indicate that the employer had failed to use reasonable care to 
prevent workplace harassment); Duviella v. Counseling Servs., No. 00-CV-2424, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22538, at *41-42 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2001) (granting summary judgment to employer on plain-
tiff's claim that her supervisor had sexually harassed her and holding that employer's policy was not 
ineffective even though the employer would not investigate complaints of harassment without a written 
complaint), affd, Duviella v. Counseling Servs., 52 F. App'x !52 (2d Cir. 2002). 
167 221 F .3d 1171 (II th Cir. 2000), reh 'g en bane denied, 240 F .3d 899 (lith Cir. 200 I). 
168 101 F. App'x 296 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
169 Norwood claimed that her supervisor Arthur Wimberly had sexually harassed her. Total System 
Servs.,22J F.3dat 1173. 
170 !d. 
171 !d. 
172 !d. at 1175. 
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must bear the risk of Title VII liability," absent a showing that Warren had 
actually lied to her employer during its investigation. 173 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It concluded that Total Systems was 
protected from a finding of retaliation so long as its determination that War-
ren had lied was an "honest" one. 174 In a remarkable passage, the court 
stated that when the employer is investigating workplace harassment, it is 
conducting its own business and that the courts should defer to such man-
agement decisions. 
[W]hether to fire an employee for lying to the employer in the course of the business's 
conduct of an important internal investigation is basically a business decision; this decision, 
as with most business decisions, is not for the courts to second-guess as a kind of super-
personnel department .... 
In the kind of investigation involved in this case, the employer is not acting pursuant to 
the statute or under color of law, but is conducting the company's own business. 
When the employer is told of improper conduct at its workplace, the employer can law-
fully ask: is the accusation true? When the resulting employer's investigation (not tied to the 
government) produces contradictory accounts of significant historical events, the employer 
can lawfully make a choice between the conflicting versions-that is, to accept one as true 
and to reject one as fictitious-at least, as long as the choice is an honest choice. 175 
The problem with the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is that it is at odds 
with the requirements of federal anti-discrimination law. In affirmative 
defense cases, an employee generally must invoke her employer's griev-
ance procedure or risk losing in any subsequent Title VII litigation. The 
story is similar in co-worker harassment cases: the employer is only liable 
for failing to remedy harassment of which it is aware. Given the difficulty 
of establishing an employer's constructive knowledge of workplace har-
assment, 176 the most reliable method to establish notice in a co-worker har-
assment case is for the victim to report the harassing conduct, using her 
employer's grievance procedure. Yet, these same employees do not enjoy 
protection from retaliation in the Eleventh Circuit for what they say during 
the employer's internal investigation. As Judge Barkett pointed out in his 
dissent from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to deny rehearing en bane, the 
court's rule creates a disincentive for employees to participate in the em-
ployer's internal investigation and for victims to report harassment to their 
employer. 
The panel opinion ... fashions a disincentive to employees' participation in internal 
investigations by drastically reducing their protection against retaliation unless the investiga-
tion arises as a result of a specific complaint filed by the EEOC. Furthermore, participants in 
173 /d. 
174 See id. at 1176. 
175 Total System Servs., 221 F.3d at 1176 (emphasis added). 
176 See supra note 162. 
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internal investigations are more vulnerable to retaliation, as tbey are conveying potentially 
damaging information, not to neutral EEOC investigators, but to tbe very people who wield 
absolute control over their employment situation, and who stand to be sued if tbe complaint 
proves valid .... 
[In addition,] [u]nder [the rule in Faragher and El/erth], tbe employee essentially is re-
quired to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by tbe em-
ployer. Thus, if tbe corrective grievance process provided by tbe employer includes an inter-
nal investigation, then tbe employee must participate in such investigation, even though he 
or she will not be protected from retaliatory acts for her statements in participating in tbe in-
vestigation .... Such a situation exposes employees to precisely tbe type of risks against 
which Title VII was intended to guard.177 
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Total Systems is troublesome. If the 
stated goal of Title VII is to increase deterrence of workplace harassment, 
then the courts should strive to make reporting less risky and burdensome 
for victims. The Eleventh Circuit's decision does the exact opposite. Fear 
of retaliation is a common reason offered by victims for not reporting har-
assment.178 The Eleventh Circuit's decision, however, makes the prospect of 
retaliation more, rather than less, likely. Furthermore, the court's caveat 
that the employer is only protected for "honest" determinations made about 
an employee's participation in an internal investigation is small comfort. 
Short of an admission by the employer, how exactly would an employee 
prove that her employer had acted dishonestly?179 
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Rennard is equally problematic. When 
Nancy Rennard complained to her employer, Woodworker's Supply, Inc. 
("WSI"), about harassment by her co-worker Larry Rogers, her employer 
disciplined both her and Rogers. 180 Rennard received a "written reprimand" 
because she had not reported Rogers's harassment within a week of when it 
began, as required by WSI's anti-harassment policy. 181 In addition, the day 
after receiving the written reprimand, Rennard received an evaluation by 
her supervisor. 182 The evaluation stated that Rennard had '"recently . . . 
become a high maintenance employee'" and that "'[a] high level of Man-
177 EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d 899, 902, 903 (lith Cir. 2001) (Barkett, 1., dissent-
ing). 
178 See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 258-59 (citing studies). 
179 Cf Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the l/lusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 
85 MINN. L. REv. 587, 645-651 (2000) [hereinafter Meritocracy Myth] (noting the difficulty for plain-
tiffs of an honest belief standard in establishing discrimination in a circumstantial evidence case). 
180 Rennard v. Woodworker's Supply, Inc., 101 F. App'x 296, 300 (!Otb Cir. 2004). WSI sus-
pended Rogers without pay for two days. Jd. 
181 /d. at 298, 300. WSI's policy provided tbat the firm would "not tolerate sexual or ethnic/racial 
harassment" and that "[a ]ny occurrence of such harassment [had to] be reported to the Personnel Man-
ager or President in writing within one week." Id. at 298. The policy provided for "discipline or dis-
missal" for failure of victims of sexual harassment to report within the one-week time frame. Id. 
182 /d. at 301. 
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agement's time, as well as other WSI employees' time has been interrupted, 
causing an undesirable work atmosphere conducive to a high productivity 
level."'183 Apart from these comments, Rennard's supervisor rated her ei-
ther satisfactory or good on the other elements of her work performance. 184 
But, Rennard claimed that this evaluation "was key to [WSI' s] decision not 
to give [her] a raise at the 90-day point [of her employment]."185 
Rennard filed a complaint with the Wyoming Fair Employment Pro-
gram ("WFEP"), which discovered other female employees at WSI who 
claimed that Rogers had sexually harassed them. 186 WSI then asked Rogers 
to resign and "verbally reprimanded" another female employee who had not 
reported Rogers's harassment to management. 187 The WFEP found reason-
able cause to believe that Rennard's allegations were true, 188 and Rennard 
sued WSI for sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. 189 
The district court granted WSI' s motion for summary judgment on all three 
claims, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 190 
Rennard argued to the Tenth Circuit that WSI had constructive knowl-
edge of Rogers's harassment because its anti-harassment policy, which 
penalized even minor delays in reporting, deterred victims from complain-
ing.191 The court, in one sentence, rejected this argument, concluding that 
Rennard offered no evidence that the finn's policy had discouraged her or 
other female employees from reporting incidents of sexual harassment. 192 
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Rennard's contention that both the 
written reprimand and her performance evaluation constituted retaliation. 
The court held that because neither the reprimand nor the performance 
evaluation resulted in "any immediate or practical effect on her job status," 
Rennard could not establish that she had suffered an adverse employment 
action, which is a required element for a Title VII claim ofretaliation. 193 As 
for Rennard's claim that she had not received a raise because of her per-
183 !d. (quoting Evaluation Report). 
184 !d. 
185 !d. at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
l86 Rennard, 101 F. App'x at 301. 
187 !d. 
188 !d. n.8. 
189 !d. at 297. 
190 !d. at 303. 
191 /d.at306n.JO. 
192 Rennard, 101 F. App'x at 306. 
193 !d. at 307. The Tenth Circuit used the definition of a tangible employment action, which deter-
mines the employer's vicarious liability for supervisory harassment, to define what constitutes an ad-
verse employment action for a retaliation claim. See id. The two concepts are not necessarily co-
extensive. 
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formance evaluation, the court concluded that there was no evidence that 
the evaluation had adversely affected WSI's decision. 194 
Rennard illustrates the problems created by the federal courts' lack of 
oversight of employer grievance procedures. Currently, under federal law, 
an employee has either 180 or 300 days, depending on whether the em-
ployee lives in a state with a fair employment agency, to file a complaint 
with the EEOC for a violation of Title VII. 195 The Tenth Circuit allowed 
WSI to significantly shorten that time period-from 300 days to one 
week. 196 Even though Rennard filed her complaint with the WFEP in a 
timely fashion, WSI disciplined her for not complying with its own report-
ing "statute of limitations."197 Thus, the Tenth Circuit allowed WSI to cre-
ate a private statute of limitations that, in effect, trumps Title VII's report-
ing period. WSI's "statute of limitations" controlled reporting because fail-
ure to adhere to its internal deadline carried with it not only possible dis-
missal of any subsequent Title VII lawsuit filed by Rennard, but also im-
mediate and adverse work-related consequences. 
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit failed to provide any recourse to Rennard 
with regard to the reprimand that she received. The court rejected her claim 
that WSI had constructive notice of Rogers's harassment because the firm's 
policy, by penalizing even minor delays in reporting, deterred women from 
reporting. 198 The Tenth Circuit also rejected Rennard's contention that the 
reprimand influenced WSI's decision not to give her a raise after ninety 
days. 199 Both conclusions are flawed. 
First, shortening the reporting time frame in cases of workplace har-
assment is problematic. By its very nature, a hostile work environment 
normally arises out of a series of harassing events that occur over time.200 
"[A] woman may brush aside early harassing events only to realize later 
that those events were the beginning of a pattern of harassment that has not 
abated."201 In fact, that is exactly what Nancy Rennard did. She did notre-
port Rogers's early conduct, even though she considered it "offensive," 
because she did not think it was sexual harassment.202 Moreover, the court's 
194 See id. at 308. 
195 See Anne Lawton, Tipping the Scales of Justice in Sexual Harassment Law, 27 OHIO N.U. L. 
REv. 517, 520 (2001) [hereinafter Tipping the Scales]. 
l96 Rennard, 101 F. App'x at 300. 
197 /d. 
198 Jd.at306n.l0. 
199 Id. at 306-07. 
200 See, e.g., Munroe v. Compaq Computer Corp., 229 F. Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D.N.H. 2002) (explain-
ing that "harassment serious enough to create a hostile work environment often involves a cumulative 
process in which a series of acts or events mount over time to create an unlawfully hostile atmosphere"). 
201 Tipping the Scales, supra note 195, at 522. 
202 Rennard, 101 F. App'x. at 298. 
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determination that the policy had not deterred Rennard from reporting high-
lights the deficiencies of the individual model. The question is not the im-
pact of the policy on Rennard, but its effect on reporting in general. If the 
purpose of having an anti-harassment policy and procedure is to increase 
reporting, then the issue is whether that policy creates incentives or disin-
centives to report. It certainly is debatable, in particular on review of a trial 
court's order granting summary judgment, whether a policy would deter 
reporting if it threatened victims with discipline or dismissal for failing to 
report harassment within a week of its occurrence. 
Second, Rennard received her performance evaluation ninety days af-
ter beginning work, and, apparently, ninety days was the period after which 
she would be eligible for a pay raise.203 Thus, any pay raise would have 
been contemporaneous with her first performance evaluation. Even the 
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the "high maintenance" comment in Ren-
nard's performance evaluation "appear[ed] to be directly related to plain-
tiff's complaints about Rogers."204 It is at least arguable, then, especially 
when reviewing a trial court's order granting summary judgment, that WSI 
retaliated against Rennard for complaining about Rogers's harassment. But, 
the Tenth Circuit narrowly defined an adverse employment action to cover 
only employer conduct having an immediate and quantifiable impact on the 
employee's status, for example a demotion or termination.205 As a result, the 
Tenth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit in Total Systems/06 significantly 
reduced the protection from retaliation that employees who report work-
place harassment could expect under Title VII. 
The social science research draws into question the assumption that 
mandating victim reporting increases deterrence of harassing conduct. Most 
victims do not report harassment. But, even if reporting were a common 
response to harassment, the federal courts have made it increasingly diffi-
cult for victims to report by failing to effectively oversee employers' griev-
ance procedures. This judicial deference reinforces the tendency of em-
203 See id. at 298, 301, 308. Rennard began work on September II, 2000, and received her first 
performance evaluation on December 12, 2000, which is approximately ninety days from the start of her 
employment. See id. 
204 Jd. at 308. 
205 See id. at 307. 
206 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits are not alone in weakening the protection against retaliation 
that is available to employees under Title VII. See, e.g., Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 265 (not-
ing that the federal courts were split on whether an unfair performance evaluation qualifies as an ad-
verse employment action for purposes of Title VII's protection against retaliation); Meritocracy Myth, 
supra note 179, at 660 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's requirement of an ultimate employment decision 
in order to make out a claim for retaliation under Title VII). The Supreme Court recently granted certio-
rari to determine what constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII retaliation 
claim. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, No. 05-259, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 9047 (Dec. 5, 2005). 
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ployers to "recast legal problems in managerial terms."207 By doing so, em-
ployers transform what, in theory, is an absolute right to a harassment-free 
work environment, into an interpersonal conflict subject to mediation and 
compromise by the employer.208 
Whereas the rhetoric of rights is central to courts and administrative agencies, the rhetorics 
of management and therapy are far more pervasive in organizational complaint handlers' ac-
counts. In contrast, there is almost no language about legal rights. By deflecting attention 
from legal rights and focusing instead on organizational problems, complaint handlers' con-
ception of dispute resolution privatizes and depoliticizes the public right of equal employ-
ment opportunity. Individual complaints are rarely linked to public rights and ideals, and the 
complaint resolution process does not involve public recognition of those rights or public ar-
ticulation of a standard to which other employees may appeal. Thus, each employee must re-
negotiate the meaning of discrimination. 209 
Moreover, the research shows that government oversight improves, 
rather than compromises, enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.210 But, 
the federal judiciary, in effect, has entrusted employers with discharging the 
societal commitment to a harassment-free workplace. This deference to 
employer decision-making has created an environment in which employers 
"develop their own rule systems regarding sexual harassment ... without 
serious ideological competition from the state. Where we might expect a 
court review and potential rejection of organizational ideology, federal sex-
ual harassment law tends to defer to and incorporate organizational ideol-
ogy into state law."211 
Thus, an employer can pre-empt the statute of limitations for Title VII 
sexual harassment claims by shortening the applicable reporting period in 
its own internal harassment policy.212 It can alter the burden of proof appli-
cable to a Title VII claim by refusing to sanction employees for sexual har-
assment '"if there is any shadow of doubt"' about whether the harassment 
occurred.213 Employers may make reporting more difficult for victims by 
207 Rational Myth, supra note 77, at 449; see Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger, & John 
Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & 
Soc'Y REv. 497,511 (1993) [hereinafter /DR]. 
20S See /DR, supra note 207, at 503-05, 511, 515-19. 
209 /d. at 529-30. 
210 See Reskin III, supra note 136, at 342 (citing studies); Reskin I, supra note 121, at 249 (citing 
studies and concluding that "[ w ]hen regulatory agencies fail to enforce laws, they send a message to 
employers, condoning segregative personnel practices"). 
211 MIA L. CAHILL, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 87 (2001). 
212 See supra notes 195-97,200-02 and accompanying text. 
213 Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Wyninger v. New 
Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that employer had responded effec-
tively to plaintiff's complaint, and concluding that even though there were deficiencies in employer's 
response, the court did not sit as a "super-personnel department" (quoting Ransom V. esc Consulting, 
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requiring written complaints.214 They also can narrow the circumstances 
under which they must respond to workplace harassment by limiting, in 
their sexual harassment policies, when they obtain notice of the harassing 
conduct. 215 
What this judicial deference to employer decision-making has created 
is not a more efficient system for eradicating workplace sexual harassment, 
but rather a system that advances employer interests at the expense of Title 
VII's intended beneficiaries. While employees have the right to a harass-
ment-free workplace in theory, the federal courts have largely eroded that 
right in practice. 
III. OBSCURING CHOICES 
"To disguise a choice in the language of definitional inexorability obscures that choice and 
thus obstructs questions of how it was made and whether it could have been made differ-
ently. "216 
Two conclusions emerge from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on 
workplace sexual harassment. The first is that the individual model of har-
assment is not the inevitable consequence of the Court's fidelity to statutory 
language or Congressional intent. Nor is it the result of the Court's atten-
tion to the empirical evidence on victim reporting as it relates to Title VII's 
primary objective of deterring workplace harassment. Rather, the Supreme 
Court deliberately deviated from established Title VII liability rules when it 
created the individual model of workplace sexual harassment. 
The second conclusion that emerges from the Supreme Court's sexual 
harassment jurisprudence is that the individual model undermines, rather 
than fosters, the deterrence of workplace sexual harassment. That conclu-
sion, in turn, gives rise to an important question: What is the primary goal 
of the individual model, if not deterrence? It is the preservation and per-
petuation of an inherently conservative, intent-based vision of anti-
Inc., 217 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2000))); Coughlin v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., No. 02 C 7849, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8088, at *40 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2004) (citation omitted) (rejecting plaintitrs contention that 
employer had not properly responded to her harassment complaint and noting that court did not "sit as a 
super-personnel department"). 
214 See, e.g., Rennard v. Woodworkers' Supply, Inc., 101 F. App'x 296, 298 (lOth Cir. 2004) 
(requiring written complaint to president or personnel manager); Ritchie v. Stamler Corp., No. 98-5750, 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 568, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (requiring written complaint to president); 
Duviella v. Counseling Servs., No. 00-CV-2424, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22538, at *40-42 (E.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 20, 2001) (requiring written complaint prior to investigation). 
215 See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 246-53 (discussing and citing affirmative defense 
cases in which federal courts defer to employer definitions of notice). 
216 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509,513-14 (1988). 
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discrimination law premised on assumptions about merit, employer ration-
ality, and the wisdom of "market" solutions to problems of employment 
discrimination. The individual model of harassment with its pro-employer 
liability standard fits neatly into a model of discrimination that requires 
conscious intent and overt bias to discriminate. That model, in tum, serves 
to reinforce unspoken assumptions about the dominance of merit-based 
employment decisions, the rationality of employer decision-making proc-
esses, and the effectiveness of market-based solutions to problems of work-
place discrimination. 
It is these assumptions, rather than fidelity to statutory language or 
deference to Congressional intent, that underlie the individual model of 
harassment. It is important to realize that the debate over sexual harassment 
law is not a debate about Congressional intent or the empirical evidence on 
victim reporting. It is a battle about beliefs: beliefs about the frequency of 
employment discrimination and the wisdom of the market. The individual 
model, with its pro-employer assumptions, bolsters these beliefs, but does 
so at the expense of Title VII's goal of deterring workplace sexual harass-
ment. 
A. Cloaked in Congressional Legitimacy 
In Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher, the Supreme Court portrayed the li-
ability standards217 it created as the inevitable result of its adherence to 
statutory language, its faithfulness to Congressional intent, and its desire to 
effectuate the statutory policy of deterring workplace sexual harassment. 
This portrayal, however, obscured the choices that the Court made in fash-
ioning the parameters of employer liability for workplace sexual harass-
ment. 
First, the majority in Meritor cast its decision to look to agency law 
principles as pre-ordained by Congress's decision to include the word 
"agent" in the definition of "employer" in Title VII. 218 The Supreme Court 
reiterated this theme of strict allegiance to statutory language in its opinion 
in Ellerth: "In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to inter-
pret Title VII based on agency principles."219 But, nothing in the statutory 
definition of employer "compel[led] recourse to the common law of 
agency.'mo Moreover, nothing in the word "agent," by itself, denotes a limi-
217 Seesupranote93. 
218 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
219 Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). 
220 Phillips, supra note 77, at 1257; see also notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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tation on employer liability, as contended by the majority in Meritor. 221 
Thus, there is no necessary connection between the statutory definition of 
employer in Title VII and Meritor's notice-liability standard. 
Second, the liability rules that the Supreme Court created in Meritor, 
Ellerth, and Faragher are not the predictable outcome of the Court's defer-
ence to Congressional intent. In Meritor, the majority adopted the notice-
liability standard advocated by the EEOC because it concluded that Con-
gress had intended to "place some limits on the acts of employees for which 
employers under Title VII [were] to be held responsible."222 Then, in its 
affirmative defense cases, the Court determined that Congress's decision, 
during deliberations on and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,223 "to 
leave Meritor intact"224 required allegiance to Meritor's holding that em-
ployers are not automatically liable for harassment by workplace supervi-
sors. 225 But, in both Meritor and the affirmative defense cases, the Court 
ignored evidence that Congress did not intend to condition employer liabil-
ity on notice or for employers to act as private EEOC's, responsible for 
conciliating and settling sexual harassment complaints.226 
In Meritor, members of the 99th Congress filed an amici curiae brief 
with the Court, challenging the notice-liability rule proposed by the EEOC 
as contrary both to the language of Title VII and the statute's remedial pur-
pose.227 They argued that "[f]aithfulness to the language and intent of Title 
VII requires that an employer's liability for its agents' sexually harassing 
acts be measured by the identical standard of liability uniformly applied in 
every other Title VII context.,z28 
In the affirmative defense cases, Ellerth and Faragher provided the 
Court with legislative history from the Civil Rights Act of 1991,229 showing 
221 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
222 !d. 
223 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
224 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998). 
225 See id. at 804. 
226 In £1/erth, the Court explained that the employer exhaustion requirement "would effect Con-
gress' intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context." 524 U.S. 742, 
764 (1998) (citation omitted). The problem with this argument is that it assumes that because Congress 
wanted to promote conciliation with the EEOC, it also intended to force victims to conciliate their 
complaints with their employers-the defendant in any impending litigation. 
227 Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Respondent at 18-20, Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 1985 WL 669773 [hereinafter Members of Con-
gress Amici Brief]. Twenty-nine members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, signed the 
brief. !d. at 1-2. 
228 Jd. at 18-19. 
229 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). On the references to the 
legislative history, see Brief for Respondent at 37-38, Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) 
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that the House Committee on Education and Labor30 affirmatively rejected 
an employer exhaustion requirement in a substitute bill, H.R. 1375, offered 
by then House Minority Leader Michel. 231 Michel's bill would have denied 
recovery to any plaintiff who "failed to avail himself or herself of a proce-
dure, of which the complaining party was or should have been aware, estab-
lished by the employer for resolving complaints of harassment in an effec-
tive fashion within a period not exceeding ninety days.m32 The House 
Committee found the employer exhaustion requirement troubling. It con-
cluded that such a requirement ''would in effect punish the victim, particu-
larly given testimony the Committee received from sex harassment expert 
Dr. Freada Klein that . . . (2) ' [ v ]ictims perceive that to come forward 
within their workplaces is to be labeled as 'troublemakers' or 'oversensi-
tive. "'233 Moreover, even though it was not a specific commentary on the 
exhaustion requirement in H.R. 1375, the full House did reject, by a vote of 
266-162, Michel's proposed bill.234 
It certainly is possible that the Court found all of this legislative his-
tory to be unpersuasive on the question of Congress's intent. For example, 
the amici curiae brief filed by members of the 99th Congress represented 
the opinion of only twenty-nine members of Congress.235 Nonetheless, it is 
odd that that in three different opinions raising the issue of Congress's in-
tent, the Court never mentioned, not even in a footnote discounting its rele-
vance, evidence suggesting that Congress did not intend to hinge employer 
liability on notice. The failure of the Court to address this evidence of legis-
lative intent is most telling in the affirmative defense cases. In Ellerth and 
(No. 97-569), 1998 WL 145325, and Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15 n.19, Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (No. 97-282), 1998 WL 66037. 
230 On April 24, the House Committee issued its report on House Report I, a "bill ... to amend the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore and strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employ-
ment, I" recommending passage of the bill, as amended. H.R. REP. No. I 02-40, pt. I, at I (1991 ), re-
printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. The Committee rejected Michel's proposed substitution of House 
Bill 1375 for House Bill I. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 103(1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 641. Congress did not enact H.R. I into law. In November of 1991, the House 
passed Resolution 270 to consider Senate Bill 1745, which Congress ultimately enacted into law as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See H.R. Res. 270, 102nd Cong. (!991). 
231 Michel's proposal, House Bill 1375, would have added language to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 
thereby expanding the scope of unlawful employment practices under Title VII to explicitly include 
harassment of "any employee or applicant for employment because of that individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." H.R. 1375, 102nd Cong. § 8(a) (1991). House Bill 1375 "was identical 
to the 1991 proposal endorsed by and introduced on behalf of the [Bush] Administration." H.R. REP. 
No. 102-40, pt. I, at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,635. 
232 H.R. 1375, 102nd Cong. § 8(a) (1991). 
233 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 103 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,641. 
234 137 CONG. REC. H3908 (daily ed. June 4, 1991). 
23S Members of Congress Amici Brief, supra note 227, at 1-2. 
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Faragher, the Court crafted an exhaustion requirement, which the full 
House rejected when it voted against Representative Michel's substitute 
bill, and which contravened the express intent of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor not to condition liability on the victim's use of her 
employer's grievance procedure. 
Finally, in addition to its invocation of statutory language and Con-
gressional intent, the Court appealed to statutory policy to justify its deci-
sion to create the employer exhaustion requirement in Ellerth and 
Faragher. In Faragher, the Court held that deterrence of discriminatory 
workplace conduct is Title VII's "primary objective."236 Obviously, the 
Court considered employers to be integral cogs in the statute's machinery 
of deterrence. Thus, it concluded that giving employers incentives to pre-
vent workplace harassment, by tying employer liability to employers' 
promulgation of anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures, would 
"implement clear statutory policy and complement the Government's Title 
VII enforcement efforts."237 
The problem with the Court's reasoning is that the success of em-
ployer grievance procedures depends on victim reporting, which is an un-
common response to harassment. More importantly, however, the Supreme 
Court was aware of the empirical evidence on victim reporting when it cre-
ated the affirmative defense. In fact, amici curiae, in briefs to the Court in 
Ellerth238 and Faragher,239 cited to various studies, including reports by the 
Merit Systems Protection Board of sexual harassment in the federal work-
place,240 which concluded that very few victims of sexual harassment for-
mally report harassment.241 The Court, however, ignored this evidence on 
the low incidence of victim reporting, instead explicitly conditioning a vic-
tim's right to recovery on use of her employer's internal grievance proce-
~- . 
236 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
237 Jd. 
238 See Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights Advocates et al. on Behalf of Respondent at 14 n. 7, 
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (No. 97-569), 1998 WL 145349. 
239 See Brief Amici Curiae of National Women's Law Center et al. on Behalf of Petitioner at 26, 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (No. 97-282), 1997 WL 800075. 
240 See MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, 
PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES (1995) [hereinafter MSPB 1995], available at http://www.rnspb. 
gov/studies/sexhar.pdf; MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT: 
AN UPDATE (1988) [hereinafter MSPB 1988], available at http://www.mith2.umd.edu/WomensStudies/ 
Genderlssues/Sexua!Harassment!MSPBReport/full-text. 
241 See MSPB 1995, supra note 240, at 33 (fmding that "only about 6 percent of victims who 
responded to our 1994 survey said they had taken formal action"); MSPB 1988, supra note 240, at 27 
(finding that only 5% of victims formally reported the harassment). For background on the MSPB 
surveys, see Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 2, at 79-81 (1999). 
860 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 13:4 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has obscured the choices that it made 
in constructing the individual model of workplace sexual harassment and 
its related liability standards. By invoking mantras about fidelity to statu-
tory language, Congressional intent, and statutory policy, the Court has 
portrayed as inevitable its choice to transform employers into private 
EEOC's. The end result is a liability framework that is a distorted amalgam 
of agency law principles and policy-based interpretations of Congressional 
intent.242 What actually underlies the individual model of harassment is not 
fidelity to agency law principles, statutory language, or Congressional in-
tent, but rather a set of unarticulated assumptions about the dominance of 
merit, the rationality of employers, and the wisdom of market solutions to 
problems ofworkplace discrimination. 
B. The Dominant Discourse 
The Supreme Court crafted the individual model of workplace sexual 
harassment because it is consistent with the dominant discourse in the 
United States about employment discrimination. Underlying the individual 
model of workplace sexual harassment is a constellation of three interre-
lated assumptions about merit, employer rationality, and the efficacy of 
market solutions to employment discrimination. 243 
242 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 n.3 (explaining that Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement of 
Agency was only the "starting point" for its analysis and noting that it was necessary to adapt agency 
principles "to the practical objectives of Title VII"). 
243 No doubt there are other reasons why the Supreme Court created an individual model of har-
assment, but I contend that these beliefs best explain the Court's creation and the lower federal courts' 
implementation of the individual model. Other reasons for the model include the Court's acceptance of 
cultural stereotypes about women's behavior that are reminiscent of myths drawn from rape law, and 
the judiciary's persistent substitution of procedural protections for meaningful substantive review of 
employer decision-making. For example, the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor that a victim's "sexu-
ally provocative speech or dress" was relevant to whether "she found particular sexual advances unwel-
come," Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986), is oddly reminiscent of the belief that 
seductive clothing serves as a proxy for a woman's consent to rape, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING 
OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY II (1997). This blame-the-victim phenomenon is a 
common response to accusations of rape, see id., and to charges of sex discrimination, see Erika Hayes 
James & Lynn Perry Wooten, Restoring Reputation: Firm Response Strategies for Managing a Dis-
crimination Crisis 26 (Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Virginia 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-02, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=520982. On the 
procedure/substance dichotomy, see Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. 1. Soc. 1531, 1538-39 (1992) (concluding that 
procedures may mask a failure to substantively comply with anti-discrimination law). For an analysis of 
the judicial tendency to create "process-perfecting theories" in order to avoid "divisive controversies 
over substantive values" in the realm of constitutional adjudication, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). 
2005] THE BAD APPLE THEORY IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 861 
The first-that merit alone determines success--dominates discus-
sions of employment discrimination in the United States.244 The belief in 
merit is so deeply ingrained that claims of employment discrimination, in-
cluding harassment, often are met with skepticism.245 It is not surprising, 
then, that "many Americans believe that [sexual harassment] is widely ex-
aggerated. "246 
The belief in merit, in turn, is entwined with the assumption that em-
ployers behave rationally, and thus do not discriminate. But, if employers 
behave rationally, then sexual harassment cannot result from systemic or 
structural causes; it must originate "outside" the organization, i.e., within 
the pathology of individual harassers, and in an episodic and necessarily 
unpredictable fashion. In part, then, a concern for fairness to employers-
giving the employer the chance to discipline or terminate a harassing em-
ployer before holding it liable-underlies the Court's notice rule. 247 But, 
fairness only partially explains the federal judiciary's deference to em-
ployer decision-making in sexual harassment cases. 
The deference accorded employers also derives from a deeply in-
grained belief, bolstered by the writings of the law and economics move-
ment/48 in the efficacy of market-based solutions to employment discrimi-
nation.249 Thus, the belief in employer rationality is tied to the assumption 
that the market can correct its own imperfections. 250 But, if the market is 
self-correcting, then government regulation is both unnecessary and poten-
244 See SONIA OSPINA, ILLUSIONS OF OPPORTUNITY: EMPLOYEE EXPECTATIONS AND WORKPLACE 
INEQUALITY 14 (1996); Meritocracy Myth, supra note 179, at 592-99. 
245 Cf Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title Vll, Print Media, and 
Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 242 (2004) (noting that 
"[ d]espite the recent advances in research on discrimination claims, the myth of litigiousness is still 
pervasive in popular culture and in politics"). 
246 RHODE, supra note 243, at 97. 
247 See supra note 86-88 and accompanying text. 
248 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 301-419 (1995) (examining the 
effect of economic thinking on American jurisprudence and, in particular, the impact of the modern law 
and economics movement on the judiciary over the past several decades). 
249 Cf Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1463, 1471 (1996) (describing the dominance of the laissez faire principle in American 
jurisprudence in the period after Reconstruction and before the New Deal and explaining that that time 
period "established a baseline of economic freedom and government largesse to which powerful busi-
ness entities, their allies in academia and think tanks, and the neo-muckrakers of the conservative media 
persistently return"); DUXBURY, supra note 248, at 329 (concluding that while the New Deal dealt a 
blow to the laissez faire principle, "faith in the efficacy of unregulated markets ... remained intact"). 
250 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133, 139 (1994) 
(concluding that "perfect competition eliminates discrimination by employers" because employers who 
discriminate in hiring incur higher costs to get the same qualified labor pool and in a perfect market, 
"lower cost producers eliminate higher cost producers"). 
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tially inefficient. This "ideological deference to the efficiency of the mar-
ket'' is one factor "influenc[ing] how [the government] regulates organiza-
tional life."251 Allowing employers to screen and resolve complaints of 
workplace sexual harassment is consistent with this faith in the market's 
and employers' rationality. 
It is important to recognize that Meritor was decided in 1986, during a 
period when these assumptions became more influential both politically 
and jurisprudentially. It is no surprise that the Reagan-era252 EEOC, which 
Clarence Thomas chaired from 1982 until 1990,253 advocated the notice-
liability standard adopted by the majority in Meritor. 254 In fact, the major-
ity's justification for deviating from both the EEOC Guidelines and estab-
lished Title VII liability rules-that the term "agent" implied some limita-
tion on employer liability-is taken almost verbatim from the Solicitor 
General's brief on behalf of the Reagan administration and the EEOC. 255 
At the same time, the Supreme Court began to embrace a more limited 
conception of what constitutes employment discrimination. Only three 
years after the decision in Meritor, the Court handed down its controversial 
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio/56 which heralded the de-
mise of the disparate impact theory257 that the Court had adopted 18 years 
251 Frank Dobbin & John R. Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the 
Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions, 104 AM. J. Soc. 441,442 (1998). 
252 
'"[R]egulatory relief was one of the four primary goals of [President Reagan's] 'economic 
recovery program.'" McGarity, supra note 249, at 1475 (footnote omitted). 
253 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.fjc.gov/publiclhome.nsf!hisj (last visited Nov. 25, 2005). During Thomas's tenure at the 
EEOC, "the number of cases in which the EEOC found cause to suspect discrimination plummeted from 
72.5 percent in October 1979 to 43.9 percent by the first half of 1986." Carol M. Swain, Double Stan-
dard, Double Bind: African-American Leadership After the Thomas Debacle, in RACE-lNG JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER 215, 217 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (footnote omitted); see also Reskin II, supra 
note 121, at 588. Thomas dissented in both El/erth and Faragher, arguing that negligence should be the 
standard ofliability in harassment cases. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
254 See DUXBURY, supra note 248, at 358 (discussing Reagan's efforts to change "the ideological 
perspective of the federal judiciary by selecting individuals who ... doubt[ed] the wisdom of govern-
ment intervention into the affairs of business"); cf Reskin II, supra note 121, at 588 (describing how the 
"probusiness presidencies of Reagan and Bush reined in the enforcement of ... Title 7''). 
255 See Phillips, supra note 77, at 1236-37. 
256 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Only a year before, the Court handed down its decision in Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), a plurality opinion that foreshadowed the Court's decision in 
Wards Cove. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "a bare majority 
of the Court [took] three strides backwards in the battle against race discrimination ... reach[ing] out to 
make last Term's plurality opinion in Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust the law") (citations omit-
ted). 
257 On the demise of the disparate impact theory, see Nicole J. DeSario, Reconceptualizing Meri-
tocracy: The· Decline of Disparate Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479 
(2003); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 
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earlier in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 258 The disparate impact theory focused 
not on employer intent or motivation, but rather on the "consequences of 
employment practices."259 Thus, disparate impact theory not only broadened 
the potential for employer liability, it also provided the beneficiaries of 
Title VII with a tool for attacking the more subtle forms of discrimination 
that predominate in the modem workplace.260 By limiting the availability of 
disparate impact theory, the Court in Wards Cove narrowed the possible 
grounds on which employers could be held liable under Title VIJ.261 As a 
result, most Title VII plaintiffs now sue using disparate treatment theory/62 
which requires either direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 
intent.263 At the same time, however, the lower federal courts, by "narrow-
ing the legal definition of actionable discrimination,"264 have made it in-
creasingly difficult for employment discrimination plaintiffs to prevail even 
on a theory of disparate treatment. 265 
The individual model of sexual harassment fits within this larger judi-
cial trend toward interpreting more narrowly the grounds for employer li-
ability under Title VII. First, the individual model is basically an intent, 
rather than a consequence, based theory of discrimination. Apart from 
claims of supervisor quid pro quo harassment, which are rare/66 the liability 
standard for both co-worker and supervisor hostile work environment cases 
requires intent to discriminate by the organizational employer, not simply 
the harassing employee. This distinction is most apparent in cases of hostile 
work environment harassment by supervisors. An organization can only act 
CORNELL L. REv. 1194, 1205-08 (2000). On the federal courts' rejection of disparate impact theory in 
pay equity cases, see ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: 
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 347 (1999). 
258 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
259 !d. at 432; see also Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 257, at 1205 (noting that disparate impact 
theory created a "standard ... of neutrality of impact, not neutrality of intent"). 
260 See, e.g., Meritocracy Myth, supra note 179, at 599-612 (on changing nature of discrimination). 
261 Congress enacted The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in part, in response to Wards Cove. See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (explaining that Wards Cove had 
''weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections"). On the effect of The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 on disparate impact theory, see DeSario, supra note 257, at 501-07. 
262 See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 257, at 1205; see also id. (noting that "disparate impact 
cases have become exceedingly rare"). 
263 See Meritocracy Myth, supra note 179, at 612-14 (explaining the differences between direct 
and circumstantial evidence cases). 
264 Meritocracy Myth, supra note 179, at 616. 
265 See generally id. 
266 Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. 
REv. 548, 565 (2001) (concluding from study of almost 650 reported federal court sexual harassment 
opinions handed down between 1986 and 1996 that "[t]he bulk of sex harassment cases involve hostile 
environment claims"). 
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through its individual employees. In a non-harassment Title VII case, the 
act of the supervisor is the act of the organizational employer.267 But, in a 
hostile work environment case, even if a supervisor intends to discriminate 
against a female employee by sexually harassing her, that act does not 
automatically become the act of the organizational employer.268 The notice 
requirement established in Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher bridged that gap 
between the harassing supervisor and the organization: the employer's fail-
ure to act once it obtains notice of harassing workplace conduct satisfies the 
element of discriminatory intent.269 
Second, the lower federal courts are making it increasingly difficult 
for a victim of workplace sexual harassment to recover against her em-
ployer. Judicial skepticism of sexual harassment claims is not uncommon. 
The concern is that absent tight judicial oversight sexual harassment law 
will become the legal dumping ground of hypersensitive employees.270 In 
Faragher, for example, the Supreme Court explained that the requirement 
that workplace harassment be "severe or pervasive" was necessary to "filter 
out complaints attacking 'the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such 
as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occa-
sional teasing.'"271 Moreover, the Court's admonition that Title VII not be-
come a "general civility code"272 is an oft-repeated refrain in the lower fed-
eral court decisions on sexual harassment.273 
267 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
268 See. e.g., Meritor Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 64, at *38-39 (statement from one 
Justice during oral argument exchange with counsel for Vinson, agreeing that Title VII "defines an 
agent of an employer as an employer himself' but disagreeing about the implications of that definition, 
noting that "all that means is there are two employers in this case; one is Taylor and the other is the 
bank ... the statute doesn't say that each employer is liable for the acts of the other"). 
269 See, e.g., id. at *9-13 (argument of Bank that Title VII's requirement of intentional discrimina-
tion requires a "notice and opportunity to cure rule," because such a rule provides clear indication of 
discriminatory intent on the part of the employer). 
270 See Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2001) 
(citation omitted) (stating that in affirmative defense cases, the court "should place a thumb on the side 
of the scale favoring summary judgment ... given 'the universal knowledge that it takes only an ag-
gressive employee, a complaisant lawyer and $150 to embroil any employer in protracted and expensive 
litigation'"); cf Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing 
unease with the "abusive" or "hostile" standards for determining when harassment becomes objectively 
severe or pervasive to amount to an actionable Title VII claim and contrasting a cause of action for 
negligence, explaining that "the class of plaintiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those 
who have suffered harm, whereas under this statute 'abusiveness' is to be the test of whether legal harm 
has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas oflitigation"). 
271 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citation omitted). 
272 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
273 See, e.g., Singleton v. Dep't Corr. Educ., 115 F. App'x 119, 122 (4th Cir. 2004); Vitt v. City of 
Cincinnati, 97 F. App'x. 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (race harassment); Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Piough 
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The judiciary's skepticism of the sexual harassment cause of action 
manifests itself most clearly in the way that federal judges handle sexual 
harassment complaints. The federal courts have interpreted the elements of 
a hostile work environment claim so narrowly that it is extraordinarily dif-
ficult for a plaintiff to survive an employer motion for summary judgment, 
let alone prevail at trial.274 Even when a plaintiff has endured physical as-
sautt275 or other criminal behavior at work,276 some courts have granted her 
employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the complained-
of conduct was simply not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hos-
tile work environment. 
Restricting the right of victims to recover for workplace sexual har-
assment is consistent with the dominant assumptions about merit, employer 
rationality, and the value of market-based solutions to employment dis-
crimination. Interpreting narrowly the elements of the sexual harassment 
cause of action means that there are fewer successful claims against em-
ployers, which legitimates employer decision-making. This, in tum, rein-
Del Caribe, Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 37-38 (Ist Cir. 2003); Alagna v. Smithville R-II Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 
975, 980 (8th Cir. 2003). 
274 See Empirical Vacuum, supra note 34, at 213-16 (explaining the trend by the lower federal 
courts to grant employer motions for summary judgment in affirmative defense cases); Tipping the 
Scales, supra note 195, at 533 (describing study by Professor Theresa Beiner of sexual harassment 
decisions issued between 1986 and 1997 showing high rate at which federal courts grant employer 
motions for summary judgment on the basis that the complained-of conduct was neither severe nor 
pervasive). The trend in granting employer motions for summary judgment in sexual harassment cases 
has occurred during a period of time in which the number of harassment complaints filed with state and 
federal fair employment agencies has increased. Victims filed 10,532 complaints in 1992, and 13,136 
complaints in 2004, an increase of 2604 complaints, or 25%, from 1992 to 2004. U.S. EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES-EEOC & FEPAs 
COMBINED: FY 1992-FY 2004 (2005), http://eeoc.gov/statslharass.html. 
275 See, e.g., Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 274 F.3d 295,297, 299 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirm-
ing trial court order granting summary judgment to employer and noting that it was a "close" question 
whether co-worker's conduct was severe or pervasive because the "unwelcome touching" happened for 
only "a few minutes each day," even though plaintiff alleged that co-worker had touched her "on a daily 
basis"); Diviny v. Village of Cottage Green, No. 03-5096,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22191, at *11 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. I, 2004) (granting summary judgment to employer on liability question and noting that it was 
"doubtful" that plaintiff could establish that co-worker's conduct was severe or pervasive, even though 
co-worker, on two occasions, grabbed plaintiff, put his arms around her waist, and kissed her on the 
neck and on a third occasion, grabbed plaintiff and attempted to kiss her). 
276 See, e.g., Durkin v. City of Chicago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 836,850-51 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (granting 
employer's motion for summary judgment on the ground that fellow officer's exposing his penis to the 
plaintiff while he was urinating and telling her to "suck this" was not sufficiently severe or pervasive, 
even though employer had not "move[ d) for summary judgment on this basis"), aff'd, 341 F.3d 606 (7th 
Cir. 2003). In Illinois, "[a]lewd exposure of the body done with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual 
desire of the person" is a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9(2) (2005). 
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forces the assumption that merit, rather than discriminatory workplace con-
ditions such as harassment, determines success on the job. 
Moreover, by limiting a victim's right to recovery unless she uses her 
employer's internal grievance procedure, the federal courts send two pow-
erful messages. The first is that the victim's problem lies not with her em-
ployer, but with an individual employee.277 For example, it would be odd 
indeed to require a non-breaching contracting party to exhaust a grievance 
procedure designed by the very party claimed to have breached the parties' 
agreement. Why, then, must a victim of harassment exhaust her employer's 
grievance procedure, unless her employer were not responsible for the harm 
alleged? Thus, the conditioning of employer liability on notice reinforces 
the assumption that employers generally behave rationally, and thus do not 
discriminate in the terms and conditions of employment.278 
The second is that employer solutions to harassment, such as internal 
grievance procedures and anti-harassment policies, are as effective as gov-
ernment regulation in protecting an employee's right to a harassment-free 
workplace under Title VII. In their study of employer EEO grievance pro-
cedures, Professor Edelman and her colleagues found that the federal courts 
play an important role "in the production of ideologies of rationality."279 
Thus, they found that the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor "legitimated 
the grievance procedure defense."280 Prior to the decision in Meritor, em-
ployers rarely invoked their internal grievance procedure as a defense to 
liability for harassment. After Meritor, however, "many more employers 
raise[d] the grievance procedure defense, and courts [were] far more pre-
disposed to listen."281 In other words, employer responses to harassment are 
not inherently rational; rather, the federal courts, in their sexual harassment 
decisions, cloak employers with the appearance of rationality. By deferring 
to employers' implementation of their internal grievance procedures, the 
courts reinforce the belief in the efficacy of market-based solutions to em-
ployment discrimination issues. As a result, employers become an integral 
part of the "Government's Title VII enforcement efforts."282 
277 On the "inherent conflict" created by these employer grievance procedures, see Tipping the 
Scales, supra note 195, at 526-27. 
278 Cf NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 257, at 12-15 (arguing that the courts locate the source of 
male-female wage disparities outside the employing organization, thereby "legitimat[ing] institutional-
ized forms of gender inequality in the workplace"); Reskin II, supra note 121, at 588 (concluding that 
"many members of the federal judiciary accept as fact the ideology that 'the market' is a neutral, unbi-
ased mechanism that sets wages"). 
279 Rational Myth, supra note 77, at 408. 
280 /d. at 439. 
281 /d. 
282 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). 
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The problem, however, with this entire model is that the victims of 
harassment are often deprived of the financial remedies afforded them un-
der federal law. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided the victims of sex 
discrimination with the right to compensatory and punitive damages against 
private employers283-a right that had been denied them under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.284 Employers, however, do not award compensatory or 
punitive damages to victims of harassment. By deferring to employers' 
solutions to workplace harassment, the federal courts effectively limit the 
remedies available under federal law. The end result of this judicial defer-
ence to employer decision-making is an inequitable system that advances 
employer interests at the expense of Title VII's intended beneficiaries. 
While employees have the right to a harassment-free workplace in theory, 
the federal courts have largely eroded that right in practice. 
CONCLUSION 
If the individual model of harassment provides an ineffective frame-
work for addressing the problem of workplace sexual harassment, what, 
then, is the alternative? It is a theory of direct liability against the employer 
for its role in creating or fostering the hostile work environment. Not all 
employers could be held liable under such a theory. Nonetheless, in many 
sexual harassment cases, the federal courts fail to recognize the connection 
between instances of sexual harassment and other indicia of sex-based dis-
crimination in the workplace.285 Thus, the direct liability theory would sup-
plant the individual model in many, but not all, cases of workplace sexual 
harassment. 
How would such a theory of liability work in practice? While the pur-
pose of this Article is not to outline in detail the parameters of such a the-
ory, a brief explanation is in order. 
First, it would apply in any or all of the following fact scenarios: (1) 
the employer maintains a sex-segregated workplace; (2) the victim per-
forms a "male-identified" job; or (3) the employer has a history of exclud-
ing women from the workforce, e.g., sex discrimination or sexual harass-
ment litigation.286 Some critics might argue that it is unfair to hold an em-
ployer liable based, for example, on the gender identification of certain jobs 
or the sex-segregated nature of its workforce. They would contend that the 
283 See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1821-
22 (3d ed. 1996). The Act extended this right only to victims of intentional discrimination. /d. at 1822. 
284 See id. at 1821. 
285 See, e.g., supra Parts Il.A-B. 
286 See, e.g., supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. 
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employer cannot control the sex composition of particular jobs or its overall 
workforce. This unfairness argument, however, is premised on the assump-
tion that the "market," not the individual employer, controls the sex compo-
sition of the employer's workforce. It is not clear, as an empirical matter, 
that that is the case. For example, Professors Nelson and Bridges found that 
organizational practices, not simply the "market," serve to maintain inequi-
ties in the pay structure for women within an organization.287 Similarly, the 
sex composition of an employer's workforce may reflect market forces, 
organizational practices, e.g., managers' expectations as to which sex fills 
which job and stereotypical evaluations of men and women's competence 
for certain types of work, or both. Assuming that the market alone controls 
the sex composition of an individual workforce confuses an empirical ques-
tion with an ideological position. 
Second, employers would have an affirmative obligation to monitor 
their workplaces for evidence of harassment. One of the deficiencies of the 
individual model is that it presumes, contrary to a substantial body of social 
science research, that employers generally maintain harassment-free work-
places. Thus, the onus for change rests with the victim of harassment. 
Given the pervasiveness and persistence of sexual harassment as a work-
place problem, employers should enjoy no such presumption. In other 
words, employers should have an affirmative obligation to periodically 
survey their employees' perceptions of the work environment. An em-
ployer's failure to do so would serve as evidence of an organizational cul-
ture tolerant of workplace sexual harassment. 
Third, a victim of harassment invoking a direct theory of liability 
would have no obligation to use an employer grievance procedure. Under a 
direct theory of liability, the victim is suing the employer for its role in cre-
ating the hostile work environment. Therefore, it makes little sense to ex-
pect the victim to entrust her complaint to the very party that created the 
harassing work environment. 
The advantage of a direct theory of liability is that it provides employ-
ers with incentives to address the underlying organizational causes of 
workplace sexual harassment. The problem is that the theory is simply un-
palatable given the federal judiciary's current stance towards employment 
discrimination claims. The debate over sexual harassment law and, in fact, 
employment discrimination law, in general, is not about the empirical evi-
dence on harassment or other forms of workplace discrimination. It is a 
debate about deeply held beliefs. Until the federal courts adopt a more 
skeptical stance toward the assumptions of employer and market rationality, 
little progress will be made in eradicating sexual harassment in the modem 
workplace. 
287 See NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 257, at 1-15. 
